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OLGA MELCHERT, NELS NIELSON, MRS. NELS NIELSON, 
C. T. NOLAN, HANNA A. MORRIS (nee HANNA A. OECK), 
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i 'TRAULT, JENS THOGERSON, J. W. TOBIN, ARTHUR 
TRETHEWAY, AMOS A. TURK, JENNIE ESP, WM. ADAMS, 
_MRS. WM. ADAMS, CATHERINE ROUDABAUGH, HARRY 
I HARVEY, w. J. HARVEY, MRS. w. J. HARVEY, DR. 0. A. 
KENCK, GRIFFITH E. DAVIS, J. R. CULVER, H. C. ERICK-
: , SON, MRS. FRAN·K ALLUM, MAGNUS KILDAHL, MRS. 
·-DELLA E. BIRD, PETER BERUBE and TONY~ TOMSHECK 
· . and MRS. TONY TOMSHECK, 
Respondents, 
vs. 
UNITED BOND AND FINANCE CORPORATION, a corporation; 
W. R: BECKSTEAD, as President of said corporation; BOYD 
. EVANS, as secretary of said corporation; W. R. BECKSTEAD, 
'BOYD EVANS, LESLIE D. SPILSBURY, et al. as directors of 
, .· said corporation; W. R. BECKSTEAD, individually, and STELLA 
. ·~ c. BECKSTEAD, his wife, EGBERT PANDOLFO, BECKSTEAD 
LIVESTOCK COMPANY, a corporation, and INVESTORS 
)THRIFT COMPANY, a corporation, 
Appellants 
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R. D. TOBI"S, indi,idually, and R. D. TOBIN, as attorney 
in fact for ,-.-olney Anderson, et al., 
Respondents) 
vs. 
"GXITED BOND AND FINANCE CORPORATION, a 
corporation; \V. R. BECKSTEAD, as President of 
said corporation; BOYD EVANS, as Secretary of 
said corporation; W. R. BECKSTEAD, BOYD 
E,;_A_SS, LESLIE D. SPILSBURY, et al., as Direc-
tors of said corporation; W. R. BECKSTEAD, indi-
vidually, and STELLA BECKSTEAD, his wife, EG-
BERT PANDOLFO, BECKSTEAD LIVESTOCK 
COMPANY, a corporation, and INVESTORS 
THRIFT COl\IP ANY, a corporation, 
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ilrief of mespou~entn 
Appeal from the District Court of the Third 
Judicial District) Salt Lake County 
Herbert 111. Schiller) J~tdge 
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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
Respondents here (plaintiffs in the court below) are 
stockholders and owners and holders of units of invest-
ment of United Bond and Finance Corporation. 
The defendants below (appellants here) are United 
Bond and Finance Corporation, its subsidiaries, officers 
and agents. 
Plaintiffs, charging mismanagement on the part of de-
fendants, commenced this suit in equity, 1) to have the 
rights and status of the stockholders determined; 2) to 
have the defendants W~ R,. Beckstead and Beckstead Live-
stock Company adjudged trustees of the property standing 
in their names, but belonging to United Bond and Finance 
corporation; 3) to have defendants render an accounting 
of the assets and property of the corporation; 4) to enjoin 
the filing and prosecuting of any further actions against 
United Bond and Financ.e Corporation involving or af-
fecting its property; 5) to restrain the defendant W. R. 
Beckstead from encumbering or disposing of any of the 
assets of the corporation, and 6) for the appointment of 
a receiver (See prayer to plaintiffs' complaint herein). 
A trial was had resulting in decree for the plaintiff 
stockholders and investors. 
Defendants have appealed. 
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CONTROVERTED STATEMENTS 
~i number of stHtements appearing under the "State-
ment of Facts" in appellants~ brief are controverted. (Ap-
pellants~ brief pp. 1-S~ Rule '"'"III). 
1) This action "·as not brought for the single pur-
pose of ha-\ing a ·•receirer appointed-'' (App. Br. 1, 2). 
Injunctive relief, an accounting and other forms of relief 
are prayed for in plaintiffs' complaint and in the prayer 
thereof. 
2) It is not conceded that ((a reserve for common 
stock u~as set up and 1naintained by the corpora.tion" on 
units sold for sums in excess of $125 (App. Br. 3). 
3) In selling the corporation's stock, W. R. Beck-
stead, like every other salesman of the corporation, used 
((his own (tuton~obile') ( Tr. 1035, 1193, 1194, 1228, 1229, 
1643) but he most certainly did not use ((his own resources 
to fi.n(uzce the venture)' (App. Br. 3). 
Beckstead~s testimony is that he did not have any 
money to put into the venture (Tr. 1227). He received 
commissions on each and every unit of stock sold by any-
one and from this source he was handsomely and well paid 
for all services he rendered in the stock-selling campaign 
( Tr. 1035, 1193, 1194). He made as much as fifteen thous-
and dollars a year ( Tr. 1653). 
As soon as the selling of stock ceased, in 1931, Beck-
stead commenced to draw a salary from the corporation, 
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first receiving $200 per month and later he raised his salary 
to $100 per week, which amount he is now drawing (Tr. 
1035, 1197, 1198). 
4) Beckstead did not invest the corporation's ((1noney 
in accordance with the corporate purpose)) ( App. Br. 3) 
and he did not do a all things necessary to keep the assets of 
the corporation invested in interest bearing securities)) 
(App. Br. 4). 
6) The corporation did change a its business activ-
ities)) and it did abandon its corporate purposes as an in-
vestment company but such changes of purpose and modifi-
cation of aits business activitie~) were not occasioned by 
the depression, nor were same done to prevent insolvency 
(App. Br. 4). 
7) It was not ((impossible for the corporation to pay 
dividends)) and the stockholders did not voluntwrily com-
mence ((trading and exchanging their stock to stock traders 
for stock in other corporatiofJ~S and other sec1trities and 
selling it for ~Dhatever price could be obtained)) (App. 
Br. 5). 
The facts are that even before the corporation was 
organized Beckstead had in mind the purchase and trading 
by the corporation for its own stock, and although this was 
and still is illegal Beckstead made provisions for such 
purchases and trading in the original articles of in corpora-
tion. 
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From the Yery beginning of the corporation and con-
tinuing during the entire stock-selling campaign thereof, 
to July, 1931, the corporation regularly paid "dividends" 
on its stock. 
Only a thorough accounting 'Yill show the sources 
from 'Yhich these '~dividends'' came and whether or not 
they represented actual earnings or 'vhether or not they 
"~ere in truth and fact but "sucker bait" paid as "come-on 
dividends" sent out to encourage the unsuspecting stock-
holders to continue sending in their installment payments 
on subscribed stock. 
The depression simply furnished Beckstead with an 
excuse and "yith an alibi for discontinuing the paying out 
of so-called "dividends", and to dishearten and discourage 
his stockholders and make them easy prey for a crew of 
unscrupulous, glib-tongued traders and stock "pickers" 
whom Beckstead supplied with "sucker lists" giving the 
names and addresses of his stockholders. By these means 
the stockholders whom Beckstead deemed "would be very 
gullible'' ( Tr. 150) "rere contacted and traded out of their 
stock in the "Cnited Bond for worthless stock, interests 
and paper in other concerns. 
It was dangerous for Beckstead, occupying the posi-
tion he did in the corporation, to deal openly and directly 
·with such "stock pickers" as Egbert Pandolfo ( Tr. l~a, 
156, 633, 1056), Art 3Iadsen (Tr. 634-642), Paradis (Tr. 
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213-216), 0. P. Pearce ( Tr. 54, 218, 225, 242-453) and a 
long list of others (Tr. 1047-1058), hence, when the stock 
"pickers" procured the stock endorsed in blank from the 
stockholders, the practice was to dispose of same througll .'1 
certain stock brokers and traders in Sale Lake City, rather 1,d11 
than dealing directly with Beckstead. ~~. 
Beckstead would then make his deal for this "hot" 
stock directly with the stock broker and by this method 
he was able to divorce himself from official and first-hand 
knowledge of the wholesale Bwindles which were being 
perpetrated upon his stockholders whereby they were 
traded out of their holdings in his corporation. 
Thus it is clear that the trading in stock came not 
((as a result of this condition)) ( App. Br. 5) called the de-
pression, but it came through the deliberate planned 
scheme of Beckstead to freeze out his stockholders, wrest 
from them their stock, and then, at the proper time, to 
convert all the corporation's assets to his individual use 
and profit. 
8) The stockholders were not ((willing to sell the 
stock for a s~mall percentage of its par or book value)) ( App. 
Br. 5), but due to the systematic and habitual evil prac-
tices of Beckstead, and due to the false and fraudulent 
representations made to his stockholders, they were led 
to believe that the corporation was insolvent and that their 
i/ 
·.~ 
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holdil!~·s had no value, as is shtnYn in the typical rase of 
:Jrirs. )layn1e ''"'ilson ( Tr. 203-~-!1, 250-266, 338-355). 
9) The evidence does not establish that the Wyon1ing 
,(ranches are being operated in a S'nccessful and efficient 
manner·· (.A.pp. Br. 6) . .~AJl these ranches were purchased 
\Yith assets of the l~nited Bond and Finance. In 1935 
Beckstead, indiridually, took title by deed to three of 
these ranches, "'vhich deeds were recorded; the title re-
mained in Beckstead's name, indiDidzu1-lly, for about three 
years. Had Beckstead died in the meantime the ranches 
most certainly would have been a part of his estate and 
title thereto would have passed to his heirs. 
Numerous stockholders protested these deals and 
when the heat "~as applied Beckstead promptly organized 
a Wyoming corporation, 'vhich he called Beckstead Live-
stock Company. To this Wyoming corporation he then 
deeded the ranches, but first he had issued to himself, 
individually, all but two of the 50,000 shares constituting 
the capital stock of that corporation and later, when more 
heat 'vas applied~ Beckstead got busy and transferred his 
stock in the Wyoming corporation to United Bond and 
Finance. The latter company has never been paid for its 
assets and funds used in acquiring the ranches and the 
ranches are not profitable ventures, but are being operated 
at a large annual loss ( Tr. 1019, 1029). 
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10) Likewise, the evidence does not establish the 
mortgage indebtedness on the ranches as ('being appro.r·i-
mately $13)700.00)) (App. Br. 6). The affairs of the two 
corporations are entirely too interwoven, intermingled and 
scrambled to determine, except by and through a thorough 
accounting, the amount of indebtedness of either the Beck-
stead Livestock Company or of the United Bond and 
Finance Corporation. 
No one can tell whether the United Bond is solvent or 
not. The books and records of the corporation are in the 
possession of Beckstead. Some of the records of the cor-
poration are missing and have been destroyed. The only 
access the plaintiffs have had to the books or records is 
when a part or portion thereof were produced in court 
during the trial. 
The United Bond and Finance has sold no stock since 
1931. It has virtually gone out of the investment business. 
'Vhen trading the stockholders out of their stock Beck-
stead, his associates: and agents have represented the cor-
poration as being insolvent) but when they come into court 
they about face and represent the corporation as being 
solvent. What is the truth? The true financial condition 
of these corporations will come to light and be kno\vn only 
after a complete accounting is had. 
Appellants' "Statement of Facts" (App. Br. 1-8) is 
entirely too meagre and too hastily drafted to inform the 
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court of the t:~s~entinl and n1nterial facts and issues that are 
here inYolved. Hence, to suppl~· the necessary information 
to this court respondents are setting forth herein a more 
comprehensive statement of the case than appears in the 
brief of appellants. 
Transcript Page References 
XOTE: Transcript page references herein are as 
pages are nu,mbered -in carbon copy of transcript supplied 
us by officia,l court reporter. In preparing brief ~oe do 
not hatie access to the transcript filed in this court. Should 
the page ruunbers differ) a table can be submitted indicat-
ing the corresponding page numbers in the official tran-
script. 
THE FACTS 
UNITED STATES BOND AND FINANCE 
CORPORATION 
'V. R. Beckstead, W. A. Green and Floyd S. Bradshaw, 
three brothers-in-lalC) (Tr. 1225, 1648) in September, 1927, 
organized the original corporation, which they called 
·enited States Bond and Finance Corporation (Tr. 15, 
1034, 1196, 1225-1227, 1235, 1651). 
The na1ne of the corporation, commencing, as it did, 
"·ith the "·ords "United States", was fraudulent in design 
anu purpose and constituted spurious advertising, in vio-
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l'ation of the federal la-\YS (See ch. 377 of the Act of Con-
gress of May 24, 1926, sees. 1 to 4, incl. ; 44 Stat. 628; 
Title 12, U. S. C. A., sees. 584-587). 
The trio of brothers-in-law immediately climbed in the 
corporation saddle, with Beckstead as president, Green as 
vice-president and Bradshaw as secretary-treasurer (Ex-
hibit A; Tr. 15). 
Beckstead became and still is the general manager of 
the corporation ( Tr. 727, 1196). 
Beckstead had no money and he put no money into the 
corporation. While he testified that each of the three 
promoters put in a check for $150 ( Tr. 1651), yet there is 
no evidence that these checks were ever cashed, and the 
testimony is that the small expenses in connection with 
the organization of the corporation were paid by Floyd 
Bradshaw (Tr. 1227). 
Thus, on the proverbial "shoestring", was started the 
corporation which was advertised and represented as an 
investment company (Tr. 1157) to loan money on first 
mortgages on homes and property and to purchase real 
estate contracts and to sell bonds ( Tr. 1039). 
While in the original articles it is stated that the three 
original incorporators had subscribed for stock in the 
corporation, W. R. Beckstead and Floyd S. Bradshaw each 
subscribing for 39 shares of Common Stock and 40 shares 
.1.1 
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of Preferred ~tock, <llHl ,, .... ~A. Green subscribing for ~0 
~h<lres of Comn1on Stot·k (lnd ~0 ~hare~ of Preferred Stock, 
yet 31r. Beckstead testified that the organizers and pro-
moters paid nothing for such ~tock, but that same 'vas a 
paper transaction, '"rhereby the stock was issued to the 
organizers and promoters upon their signing a promissory 
note, 'vhich note "·as never paid ( Tr. 148, 1663, 1664, 1715). 
He testified that the above mentioned stock, 
·',yas issued and placed in the treasury, and assigned 
over to the corporation, with a promissory note, and 
that 'vas held "Tith the note as collateral, and later 
on that "\Yas canceled and the note was canceled. 
"So, the turning in of the stock and the value of 
it, canceled the obligation of the note" ( Tr. 1648, 
1663, 1664). 
Regarding the Common Stock which was issued to 
'V. R. Beckstead, he testified: 
"I don't believe I paid cash for any of it" ( Tr. 
1649). 
Again: 
"I didn't pay any money for it. The stock that 
the United Bond issued to me, I told you a minute 
ago, I didn't pay any money for any of the stock" 
( Tr. 1649). 
It was testified that "in the neighborhood of about 
300 shares" of Common voting Stock was issued by Floyd 
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Bradsh'aw, but the books of the corporation do not indicate 
that Mr. Bradshaw paid anything in money or property 
for the issuance to him of such shares, and Mr. Beckstead, 
president of the corporation, and Boyd Evans, secretary-
treasurer and bookkeeper for the corporation, were unable 
to inform or advise the court, when on the witness stand, 
of any money or thing of value that had been given by 
Mr. Bradsha"r to the corporation for the stock so issued 
to him ( Tr. 1662, 1666, 1678, 1680, 1705). 
The minutes of the corporation were searched but they 
contain no minute entry and show no authorization, either 
on the part of the directors or of the stockholders for the 
issuance to either Beckstead or to Bradshaw of any stock 
of the corporation, either Common or Preferred ( Tr. 1666, 
1678). 
The Stockholders Supplied All the Capital 
Starting with nothing) all of the capital of the corpora-
tion was furnished and supplied by respondents and other 
stockholders and investors who bought and paid for the 
Preferred Stock of the corporation. 
No part of the capital of the corporation, either in 
money or property, was contributed or supplied by the 
brother-in-lau' trio of promoters,-Beckstead, Green and 
Bradshaw. 
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'''"bile the corporation '"as organized under the laws 
of rtah, it did not eon1ply 'Yith Utah ·s Seeurities Act, nor 
did it eT"en apply for a license to sell its stock in Utah 
(Tr. 1228). 
To get the money on 'Yhich to do business Beckstead 
and his associates immediatel~T launched a high-pressure 
stock-selling campaign ( Tr. 1035, 1229). 
Beckstead actiYely participated in the sales of the 
stock of the corporation ( Tr. 1034, 1035, 1193, 1642). In 
addition numerous other salesmen were engaged ( Tr. 
1238). 
The stock of the corporation was first sold in the 
State of Ne-vada, where the selling commenced in Septem-
ber, 1927 ( Tr. 1228, 1229) . 
:Kext, in the year 1928, the company qualified itself 
to do business in the state of Montana, and thereupon 
immediately commenced selling its stock in that state (Tr. 
1034, 1229 ) . 
The stock salesmen received no salaries but worked 
on a strictly commission basis, paying their own expenses 
( Tr. 1228, 1229). 
Beckstead likewise, during the entire stock-selling 
campaign, and until December, 1931, received no salary 
whatever from the corporation ( Tr. 1035, 1193, 1643). He, 
like the other salesmen, paid his own expenses ( Tr. 1193, 
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1194), accepting for his entire compensation the commis-
sions which he received on the sales of the company's stock 
and securities· ( Tr. 1035, 1193, 1194, 1643). 
The stock was offered for sale in "units", a unit con-
sisting of one share of Common Stock and one share of 
Preferred Stock. 
Originally the stock sold at $125 per unit, later at $135 
per unit and finally at $150 per unit ( Tr. 907, 1238, 1647). 
:1\ir. Beckstead received the same commission on the 
securities which he sold as did the other salesmen, and in 
addition thereto he received, what he terms, an "overwrit-
ing" commission on all the stock sold by the other sales-
men, which "overwriting" commission amounted to about 
$2.50 per unit ( Tr. 1194, 1195, 164 7). 
The moneys received from the sale of units of stock in 
excess of the par value of $100 per share of the Preferred 
Stock was to be used for the payment of commissions to 
salesmen, the "overwriting" commission to the manager, 
W. R. Beckstead, and for advertising and office expenses. 
Thus, upon the sale of a unit of stock for $125 the sum of 
$25 would be used for the payment of commissions, ex-
penses and charges last above mentioned, and the balance, 
in the amount of $100, it was represented, would be re-
tained by the corporation intact and would go to make up 
the capital of the corporation to be used for investment 
purposes ( Tr. 1660, 1661, 1730-1733). 
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Classes of Corporate Stock 
In the beginning the corporation had only two classes 
of stock. 
I?irst, there \Yere 300 shares of Common Class A Stock, 
·which "Tas the roting stock, but "Thich had no par vpJne. 
Second, there "Tere 500 shares of Preferred Stock, 
which \Vas non-voting stock, having a par value of $100 per 
share, and which \Yas to receive dividends of 7lf0 per an-
num (Exhibit .. :-\_; Tr. 15, 728, 1238). 
The Preferred Stock certificates contained a provision 
therein reading : 
"Such Stock shall be redeemable, in whole or in 
part, at the option of the Corporation, at any time 
or times at one hundred and five (105lf0 ) per cent 
of the par value thereof plus accrued dividends, if 
retired within five years after the i~suance of such 
share or shares, or at the par value thereof plus 
accrued and unpaid dividends if retired after the 
expiration of said five years, upon such notice and 
in such manner as may be prescribed by the Board 
of this Corporation." 
Later, by a series of amendments to the articles, ad-
ditional classes of stock were provided for from time to 
tiine and the amount of the capital stock was increased. 
After the last of such amendments the capital stock 
structure \vas as follo\vs ( Tr. 15, Exhibit A) : 
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1,000 shares Common Class A Stock (voting stock) 
no par value 
10,000 shares Common Class AA Stock (Double A 
non-voting stock) no par value 
7,500 shares Preferred Stock, par value $100 per 
share 
5,000 shares Common Class B Stock (non-voting 
stock) no par value (Exhibit A; Tr. 15) 
The holders of Common Class A Stock have the sole 
and exclusive voting rights: in the corporation, and there-
fore the exclusive right to select the directors, officers and 
agents of the corporation and to control its affairs and 
establish its policy (Exhibit A; amendment to articles, 
Tr. 15). 
Early in its stock-selling campaign the corporation 
discontinued issuing the Common Class A voting stock 
( Tr. 1359) and on December 29, 1928, by an amendment 
to its articles, provided for another class of common stock, 
which is designated as Class B Common Stock, and pro-
vided therein, 
"that the common stock class 'B' and the holding 
or ownership thereof shall not carry with it any 
right to vote at any meeting of the stockholders". 
On January 27, 1931, by a fourth amendment to its 
articles, the corporation provided for the creation and is-
suance of 10,000 shares of Common Class Double A Stock 
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.. without nonu~nal or par ca luc '), \Yhich an1end1nent further 
provided: 
" (b) Said shares of Preferred stock, and said 
shares of Common Class B Stock and said shares of 
Common Class Double .A. stock, or any of them, shall 
not haYe, and the holding or ownership thereof, 
shall not carry "yith it an~y right to vote at any meet-
ing of stockholders, either for the election of di-
rectors. amending the Articles of Incorporation in 
any particulars, or for establishing priorities or 
creating preferences among the several classes. of 
stock or creating new issues of stock, for consolida-
tion, for voluntary dissolution or for any other 
rna tter, purpose or thing affecting the business and 
affairs of the corporation, and no notice of any kind 
of any meeting or meetings of stockholders of this 
corporation shall or need be given to the holder or 
holders of said shares of Preferred Stock, Common 
Class B Stock and Common Class Double A Stock." 
( Tr. 13, Exhibit A) 
After the amendment to the articles of December 29, 
1928, above referred to, no Common Stock having any 
~otill g power was issued to the investors purchasing stock 
of the corporation. 
From then on a "unit" of stock consisted of one share 
of non-voting Preferred Stock and one share of non-voting 
Common Stock, being either Class Double A (Class AA 
C(numon Stock) or Class B Common Stock ( Tr. 1360, 
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1361). Thus, subsequent to the foregoing amendments, the 
investors who purchased units of stock, consisting entirely 
as they did of non-voting stock, at no time were accorded 
any right to participate in any manner in the selection of 
the officers or in the management of the affairs of the cor-
poration. 
Two reasons were given by Mr. Beckstead for the issu-
ance of this stock which carried with it no voting privileges 
whatever. :B.,irst, "it cost too much money to call a stock-
holders' meeting". Second, "I was interested in control-
ling the business" ( Tr. 1360) . 
Beckstead Has Absolute Control of Corporation 
By the year 1933 ninety per cent ( 90% ) of all the 
Common Class A voting Stock issued, stood on the books 
of the corporation in the name of Mrs. Stella C. Beckstead, 
she being the wife of the director-president-manager-
,V. R. Beckstead. 
Out of a total of 572 shares of Common Class A stock 
outstanding, l\Irs. Stella C. Beckstead holds 511 shares; 
one share each is held by Beckstead, Spilsbury and Evans, 
who constitute the board of directors, leaving only 58 other 
shares of voting stock outstanding ( Tr. 1233, 1238, 1239 ) . 
All of the stock now standing in the name of l\1 rs. 
Stella Beckstead has been transferred from stock that 
formerly stood in the name of her husband, 'Vesley I-t 
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Beckstead ( Tr. 1658). BPekstead has the custody of all 
these certificates, san1e being kept by him in his safety 
deposit box at the bank (Tr. 1654). 
On the "?i tness stand Beckstead was asked if these 
~ertificates of stock had not been endorsed in blank by his 
wife ( Tr. 1654, 1655) and he replied : 
(•J zroztldn)t say; I don't think they are, Mr . 
. ..-\. dair" ( Tr. 1655) . 
Demand was made upon Beckstead to produce the 
certificates in court "to see whether they are endorsed or 
not" ( Tr. 165-!), but the certificates 'vere never produced. 
The reasons given for failure to produce the certifi-
cates were 1) that they "are in custodia legis)) having been 
attached as ~lr. Beckstead's property in a suit brought 
against him by his former attorneys, Hurd & Rurd, for 
legal services rendered, and 2) Beckstead; s key to his 
safety deposit box may have been lost ( Tr. 1655, 1656). 
Boyd Evans, secretary-treasurer-bookkeeper for the 
corporation, paid nothing for his one share of Common 
Class A voting Stock. 
Leslie D. Spilsbury, although he has continuously 
been on the board of directors since the creation of the 
corporation ( Tr. 15), knows little, if anything, of the 
affairs of the corporation and has acquiesced in all deals 
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of the corporation that have been called to his attention 
( Tr. 785-819). 
Beckstead, the director-president of the corporation, 
and Boyd Evans, the director-bookkeeper, constitute a 
quorum of the present board of directors. Thus does Beck-
stead, with his two "dummy" directors, have absolute con-
trol of the corporation (Exhibit A; amendment to articles 
reducing number of directors to three;· Tr. 15, 1654). 
l\1r. Beckstead at no time ever purchased any Pre-
ferred Stock in the corporation and neither he nor his wife 
own or hold any such Preferred Stock ( Tr. 1659). 
Selling of Stock-"Come-on" Dividends 
In the beginning, and during the entire stock-selling 
campaign, which continued to the year 1931, rosy pictures 
were painted for the investors and great encouragement 
was given them to induce them to part with their savings 
and invest same in the stock and securities of the corpo-
ration. 
Much of the stock of the corporation was sold on in-
stallment contracts. The stock thus sold would not be 
issued until it was fully paid for and, of course, in the 
meantilpe, the investor "rho was paying on such install-
ment contracts, was not permitted to participate in any 
"earnings" or "dividends" of the corporation ( Tr. 1230, 
1231) 0 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-21-
During the years 1927 to 1931, the corporation wrote 
numerous letters to its investors ". ho were purchasing 
stock on installment contracts, encouraging and urging 
them to speed up the time of the payment in full of their 
contracts so as to entitle then1 to participate in the "divi-
dends~' of the corporation. 
From the Yery beginning of the company, "dividends" 
were declared and wide publicity was given of this fact 
for the encouragement of the investors ""rho received let-
ters, notices and advertising of the declaration of "divi-
dends·· in the years 1928, 1929, 1930 and in July, 1931 ( Tr. 
12-±0, 12-±2). 
In the year 1931 the selling of stock ceased and since 
July, 1931, no "dividends" have been declared or paid, 
except a small "dividend" amounting to one-half of one 
per cent, being fifty cents on a $100 share of Preferred 
Stock, which "dividend" was declared in the year 1937 
( Tr. 885, 886). 
CHANGE OF CORPORATE NAME 
On January 27, .1931, by amendment to its articles, 
the word "STATES" was dropped from the name of the 
corporation and the company's name 'vas changed to 
United Bond and Finance Corporation (Tr. 15, 16). 
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TRADING INVESTORS OUT OF THEIR STOCK 
Next came an era of discouragement for the stock-
holders and investors of the corporation. 
In the year 1931, and after the selling of stock had 
ceased, the corporation, or its manager, 1\Ir. Beckstead, 
commenced to trade the corporation's stockholders out of 
their stock. 
Numerous and divers methods, devices, agencies, in-
strumentalities, as well as corporations, were used by the 
United Bond and Finance Corporation, and its manager, 
Mr. Beckstead, to trade the corporation's stockholders and 
investors out of their stock. 
"Sucker" Lists 
Experienced securities salesmen, traders and stock 
"pickers" were contacted. 
To these were furnished lists containing the names 
and addresses of the various investors and stockholders of 
the tJnited Bond and Finance Corporation. With the 
assistance of such listS' of stockholders, called "sucker" 
lists, the stockholders were contacted and efforts were 
made to "pick up" or trade them out of their stock ( Tr. 
149, 150, 152, 189, 190, 531, 534, 545, 636-640, 681). 
Various kinds of paper were used in making the trades, 
including whiskey warehouse receipts, participating cer-
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tificates in oil companies, intPrests in oil lease royalties, 
stock of InYt:~stoi·s Thrift Corporation and stock of Ameri-
can Keene Cement & Plaster Company (Tr. 149, 150, 151, 
152, 18~, 18~), 190, 227, 228, 531, 534, 636-640, 681). 
To the stockholders it "?as represented that their 
~tocks had suffered the usual depreciation because of the 
depression and that the company was practically insolvent 
( Tr. 221, 531, 332). 
In the event the stockholders should decline to ex-
change their stock for this other worthless paper, then 
the salesmen and stock "pickers'' were authorized to offer 
them ~'ten or fifteen dollars per unit for the stock" ( Tr. 
533) for "yhich they had paid Mr. Beckstead and his cor-
poration from $125 to $150 per unit ( Tr. 533, 1092; see 
also 1043, 1047, 1157, 1368). 
The corporation also accepted its own stock in pay-
ment of rent due it ( Tr. 107 4). 
The corporation purchased its own bonds from in-
~estors for sixty cents on the dollar ( Tr. 1059). 
'Vhy should an investor holding bonds of a solvent 
corporation accept sixty cents on the dollar in payment 
of such bonds? 
For stock having a total par value of $203,087.11, 
Beckstead paid, including not only the cost of stock, but 
commissions and brokerage as well, the sum of $83,158.54 
( Tr. 1077; see also 10J 7-1050, 1055-1076). 
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Pogliano Is Defrauded Out of His Stock 
In the fall of 193l Art Madsen went to Livingston, 
Montana, where, for a questionable "oil lease proposition" 
he traded one Pogliano out of the latter's units of stock 
in United Bond and IT'inance. 1\iadsen immediately passed 
these units of stock on to Jack Oldroyd, a security broker 
of Salt Lake ( Tr. 640), who, in turn, "sold" the stock to the 
corporation after the investor, Pogliano, had advised the 
corporation and Mr. Beckstead that he had been swindled 
by Madsen, and that he did not want his stock transferred 
( Tr. 640, 857-861, 875-884, 1063-1065, 1301). 
Thus, it is plain that but for this litigation the de-
fendant Beckstead, and the corporation which he dom-
inates, would still be engaged in "picking up" the stock of 
his unfortunate and helpless stockholders and investors 
whose interests he is required by law, as well as by con-
science, to protect. 
H. 0. L. C. Loans on Corporation's Property 
To obtain funds with which to buy up the corpora-
tion's own stock, Mr. Beckstead borrowed money on prop-
erty of the United Bond and Finance from the Home 
Owners' Loan Corporation ( Tr. 502-504). 
The witness, Mr. Gull, testified ( Tr. 506, 507) : 
"I asked Mr. Beckstead how much stock had 
been retired by the use of money realized from, par-
i:d 
'':J' 
)I 
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ticnlarly from these H. 0. L. 0. loans, and he said 
that 'vas difficult to determine as to the par value 
or market Yalue, because it 'yas bought at various 
prices, but that, approximately, as I recall, fifty-
nine thousand plus, actual money, had been used 
in the retirement of these certificates. As to how 
many thousands of dollars worth of stock, I don't 
know that it "~as even mentioned, other than as 
stated"' (Tr. 503, 507). 
The Little Pouch 
The certificates of stock purchased were endorsed in 
blank (Tr. 50-!) and "~ithout being turned back to the 
treasury ( Tr. 909) and "~ithout being cancelled or reissued, 
the certificates, still in their original form, were kept and 
permitted to accumulate in "a little pouch" ( Tr. 910). 
Thus, for a number of years, in "a little pouch", there 
reposed Preferred Stock of the corporation of the par 
value of $203,087.11 (Tr. 1077), to say nothing of the 
Common Stock,-all of it endorsed in blank and requiring 
only that the name of the transferee be written in to obtain 
a reissuance thereof to the holder who should present same. 
How simple to write in the name of a transferee of 
the stock certificates? 
Ho'Y convenient to have all the certificates together in 
"a little pouch"? 
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Mayme ''Tilson was traded out of her United Bond 
and ]j.,inance Corporation stock in October, 1931 ( Tr. 213-
215), and eight ( 8) years later, in October, 1939, Pogliano 
'vas traded out of his stock ( Tr. 857-861, 875-885). The 
stock "was just held" ( Tr. 838) in "a little pouch" and per-
mitted to "accumulate" ( Tr. 910) until litigation arose, 
\Vhen transfer certificate No. 872, dated January 10, 1940, 
for five hundred thirty-one ( 531) shares of the "accumu-
lated" stock was issued to United Bond and Finance Cor-
poration (Tr. 857) and included therein, among many 
others, was the certificate of Mayme Wilson and the cer-
tificate No. 162 of G. A. Pogliano (Tr. 857, 867-870). 
Mr. Gull interviewed Mr. Beckstead regarding the 
holding of the certificates of stock, so endorsed in blank, 
and testified ( Tr. 504, 505) : 
"I told him that I wasn't at all concerned over 
the application of the money in the retiring of the 
stock, if I were assured that the stock, when retired, 
would be actually canceled by the company and in-
ure to the benefit of the stockholders. 
"Mr. Beckstead wanted to know why I intimat-
ed that that wasn't being done. I told him infor-
mation had been received by my department from 
interested stockholders that it was not being done, 
and that the certificates were being endorsed in 
blank, and were being held by the company without 
cancellation. 
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"He readily admitted it. He said the certifi-
cates 'Yere largely receiYed and held in blank * * .,. 
'·I asked )lr. Beckstead to justify the reason for 
holding those certificates 'Yithout cancellation, and 
he said that upon ad"lice of his auditors, that the 
moneys of the company could not be used for traf-
ficking in the company's own stocks, and they were 
being held to an appropriate time when the cancel-
lations could be made legally and properly, and that 
that 'vould be done; and at that time in our diS'cus-
sion he admitted, and later gave us a financial state-
ment to agree "ith it, of approximately fifty-nine 
thousand dollars worth of stocks that w·ere so in-
volved.·· ( Tr. 504, 505) 
INVESTORS THRIFT CORPORATION 
ln"lestors Thrift Corporation was incorporated under 
the laws of Utah on September 22, 1931. Its five incorpo-
rators and directors consisted of the president, the secre-
tary-treasurer and two employeeS' of the United Bond and 
Finance Corporation, together with Raymond Hill, a 
brother of the secretary-treasurer of United Bond and 
Finance Corporation (Exhibit B; Tr. 18, 743-746, 1208). 
Excepting only for one qualifying share each issued 
to ~1iss Christopherson, )liss Hall and Raymond Hill, all 
of the Common Stock of Investors Thrift was subscribed 
for and issued to Vf. R. Beckstead, director, president and 
n1anager, and to James C. Hill, director and secretary-
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treasurer, of United Bond and Finance Corporation, Beck-
stead receiving 7,999 shares and James C. Hill 7,998 shares 
(Exhibit B; Tr. 18, 7 46, 1210). 
Property belonging to United Bond and Finance Cor-
poration was taken and turned in "to pay" for these shares 
of Investors Thrift stock so issued to Beckstead and Hill. 
The property used for this purpose consisted of two con-
tracts of purchase on the Premier and Norma Dean apart-
ment houses in Salt Lake City, owned by United Bond 
and Finance Corporation, which two contracts Beckstead 
and Hill caused to be assigned and transferred to them-
selves individ1tally) whereupon they turned over and as-
signed such contracts to Investors Thrift Corporation for 
the entire issue of its Common Stock as above set forth 
( Tr. 764, 769, 770, 1209, 1210). 
Although the trial court called for the production of 
the above contracts same were never produced. Appar-
ently the contracts are lost ( Tr. 1122). 
'rhe stock of Investors Thrift Corporation had no 
value and, of course, no dividends were ever paid thereon 
( Tr. 759). 
Notwithstanding, Mr. Beckstead and his associates 
effectively used this worthless stock in Investors Thrift 
Corporation to trade the investors holding stock in the 
United Bond and Finance Corporation out of their stock 
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( Tr. 33, 36, 79, S0-82, 90-92, B3, 158, 159, 77 4, 775, 1210, 
1~33-126-!, 13GS~ 1369, 1399-1403). 
The offices of InYestors Thrift Corporation and of 
l"'"nited Bond and Finance Corporation were in the same 
room of the same building. Both corporations had one 
and the same telephone number (Exhibits Q and R; Tr. 
89, 90, 780). The lettering of both corporations' appeared 
on the doors of the office ( Tr. 157) . 
In .A .. ugust, 1931, James C. Hill terminated his em-
ployment with both the "L ... nited Bond and Finance Cor-
poration and ''ith InT"estors Thrift Corporation and was 
succeeded by his cousin, -n"'"illiam L. Christensen ( Tr. 780, 
781, 782). 
""'"hen the Investors Thrift had served its purpose as 
a trading medium for acquiring United Bond and Finance 
Corporation stock numerous "stock pickers" were then 
engaged and set out to "pick up" and trade the former 
inYestors of the United Bond and Finance Corporation 
out of the stock which they had acquired in Investors 
Thrift Corporation. 
\Vhiskey "\Yarehouse receipts and worthless stock in 
American Keene Cement & Plaster Company were used 
for the purpose of trading such investors out of their stock. 
\Yhen this trading had about ceased, and about the year 
1935 or 1936, James C. Hill turned back, 1mthout consid-
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erationj all his remaining stock in Investors Thrift Corpo-
ration ( Tr. 757). 
James C. Hill was the original president of Investors 
Thrift Corporation and at the same time he was director 
and secretary-treasurer of United Bond and Finance Cor-
poration. 
On li.,ebruary 17, 1933, Leslie D. Spilsbury, then, and 
now a director of United Bond and Finance Corporation, 
became president of Investors Thrift Corporation and con-
tinued as such until Investors Thrift Corporation was, on 
the petition of Mr. Spilsbury filed J\1ay 26, 1.938, (Exhibit 
C) formally dissolved by court action ( Tr. 791, 794, 795). 
The United Bond and Finance Corporation purchased 
for $1500, the assets of the Investors Thrift Company upon 
the latter's dissolution, and included in these assets were 
33 shares of Preferred Stock of the United Bond ( Tr. 
1217). 
Upon the dissolution of the Investors Thrift Corpora-
tion Mr. Beckstead "told Mr. Spilsbury to take the books 
with him" ( Tr. 1218-1220) . 
After delivering the books and recordS' of the Investors 
Thrift Corporation to Mr. Spilsbury they became lost ( Tr. 
795,796,800,801,804,805,806,947-950,954,936,957,962). 
Some of these books and records which Mr. Beckstead 
and l\1r. Spilsbury testified had been "lost" "rere discovered 
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by the plaintiff stoekholders and introduced in evidence at 
the trial. 
AMERICAN KEENE CEMENT & PLASTER COMPANY 
JONES INVESTMENT COMPANY 
American Keene Cement & Plaster Company was, on 
:Xovember 8, 1933, incorporated under the laws of Utah 
(Exhibit D; Tr. 21). 
Grant L. Crandall, another brother-in-la1v of W. R. 
Beckstead, ( Tr. 488, 581, 1266, 1267, 1272, 1468) and C. R. 
Jones ".,.ere incorporators and on its board of directors 
(Exhibit D; Tr. 21, 1266, 1267). C. R. Jones was president 
and Grant L. Crandall 'Yas vice-president and S'ecretary of 
American Keene Cement & Plaster Company. 
On November 6 ,1934, both Crandall and Jones quali-
fied and became directors of United Bond and Finance 
Corporation (Exhibit A; Tr. 16, 1526). 
C. R. Jones was also secretary of Jones Investment 
Company '"hich had its offices in the same room of the 
same building occupied by American Keene Cement & 
Plaster Company; namely, Room 408 of the Beason Build-
ing, Salt Lake City ( Tr. 1517). 
On October 1, 1934, the following four certificates of 
stock in American Keene (Jement & Plaster Company were 
issued, viz. ( Tr. 1;)17-1523) : 
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Cert. No. Stockholder No. Shares 
19 W. R. Beckstead 5,000 
20 G. L. Crandall 26,000 
21 G. L. Crandall 2,500 
22 United Bond & Finance Corp. 6,800 
Beckstead paid nothing for the 5,000 shares issued to 
hi1n in his brother-in-law)s company ( Tr. 1265, 1517, 1518, 
1519). 
The brother-in-law) Grant L. Crandall, testified, he 
"didn't remember" what, if anything, he paid for his 26,000 
shares ( Tr. 1517, 1520). 
For the 6,800 shares issued to United Bond and Fi-
nance Corporation no cash w~as involved) but there was an 
exchange of stock in brother-in-law· Beckstead's United 
Bond and Finance Corporation for the stock of brother-
in-law Crandall's American Keene Cement & Plaster Com-
pany (Tr. 1523, 1533) whereby Crandall and Jones, 
each individually) received five ( 5) shares of Common 
Class B Stock ( Tr. 1532) and one ( 1) share each of Com-
mon Class A voting s:tock, which latter stock enabled them 
to qualify as directors in United Bond and Finance Cor-
poration and each of them did qualify and become a di-
rector in said corporation ( Tr. 1268, 1521, 1523, 1327, 
1528). 
The stock in the American Keene Cement & Plaster 
Company, so obtained by Beckstead for nothing "·as worth 
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exaetly "That it cost him, to-\Yit, nothing) as Beckstead well 
knew· ( Tr. 47, -!8, 82, 123, 124, -!83, -512, 513, 1575). 
:X evertheless, the 5, 000 shares of stock so issued to 
Beckstead, indicidually. and the 6,800 shares issued di-
rectly to United Bond and Finance Corporation, were used 
to trade inYestors and stockholders of either United Bond 
and Finance l~orpora tion or of Investors Thrift Corpora-
tion out of their stock and holdings ( Tr. 40-50, 54-59, 63, 
72, 80-83, 89-91, 113-119, 123-125, 1099, 1272-1285, 1420, 
1-121, 1507 - 1515, 1518, 1520 - 1526, 1572, 1588 - 1598, 
1605-1607). 
In many of these transactions the Jones Investment 
Company proved most helpful in effecting stock transfers 
and in consummating trades ( Tr. 487, 488, 489, 1517-1533). 
ASHTON-JENKINS COMPANY and 
ASHTON-JENKINS INSURANCE COMPANY 
Involved "ith the United Bond transactions were two 
corporations bearing most similar names, viz.; a) Ashton-
Jenkins Company and b) Ashton-Jenkins Insurance Com-
pany ( Tr. 1335). 
\Y"ith assets of United Bond, including a ranch near 
Ogden ·ralued at $20,000.00 ( Tr. 1345), ~Ir. Beckstead 
traded for the con trolling stock of Eddie Jenkins in the 
..:\shton-~Jenkins Co1npany of Salt Lake City (Tr. 1335-
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1337) and Beckstead becan1e president of Ashton-Jenkins 
Co1npany, whereupon he moved the offices of United Bond 
and Finance Corporation and those of Investors Thrift 
Corporation to the rear of the offices of Ashton-Jenkins 
Company ( Tr. 1338-1339). 
An audit of the books of Ashton Jenkins Company 
showed shortages and deficits which resulted in a receiver-
ship for that company ( Tr. 1338, 1339). 
At the time of the above transaction there "\Vere also 
issued to Ashton-Jenkins Company 312 shares of Preferred 
Stock and 312 shares of Common Stock of Investors Thrift 
Corporation, but Mr. Beckstead could not r~member what 
the consideration was for the issuance of this stock ( Tr. 
1351, 1352) . 
In a separate transaction and with funds of the· United 
Bond and Finance Corporation, l\1r. Beckste~d paid $12,-
.,:.. 
500.00 for the insurance company known as ·Ashton-Jenk-
ins Insurance Company (Tr. 1341-1344). 
This transaction resulted in a lawsuit by Beckstead 
and Investors Thrift Corporation, plaintiffs, against Ash-
ton-Jenkins: Insurance Company, et al. defendants, Case 
No. 51249, wherein plaintiffs demanded judginent of $30,-
000.00 (Tr. 1341-1346). 
The original agreement with As:hton-Jenkins Insur-
ance Company has become lost ( Tr. 1343) but a copy of 
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this agreement, attached as Exhibit A to the cornplaint in 
rase :Xo. 312-!9 supra. sho,Ys that the agreement was with 
'Yesley R. Beckstead, indicidually) and not 'Yith the United 
Bond and Finance or lnYestors Thrift Corporation ( Tr. 
1364-1366) . 
. A.lso, there "~as an assignment of $20,084.99 in claims 
made to )lr. Beckstead, personally and individually, as 
part of the abo\e transaction ( Tr. 1367, 1368). 
WYOMING RANCHES AN.D INVESTMENTS 
... \bout 1935 the United Bond and Finance Corporation 
began selling,. trading and disposing of its property and 
investments in the state of Montana, and in 1936 it with-
drew completely from the state of Montana ( Tr. 1042-
1047). 
· About t~s same time l\fr. Beckstead began to purchase 
ranches,. livestock and other property in Unita County, 
Wyoming, using the property, assets and funds of the 
United Bond and Finance Corporation to make such pur-
chases ( Tr. 1159, 1160). 
Purchase of the Marks Ranch 
On May 9, 1935, Louis A. ~larks and wife entered into 
a "Titten agreemeent with United Bond and Finance Cor-
poration to sell to that company their ranch, comprising 
-~ 
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904 acres of land in Wyoming, together \vith 290 head of 
cattle, a certain land lease, certain telephone company 
stock, and certain farm machinery and personal property 
( Tr. 129, 130). 
Pursuant to this agreement the Marks ranch and 
equipment was purchased with property and funds· of the 
United Bond and Finance Corporation, but when the in-
struments transferring title were made out, in 1935, on 
instructions from Mr. Beckstead, the deeds, bills of sale, 
assignments of leases and assignments of livestock brands 
were all made to W. R. Beckstead, individually ( Tr. 135, 
138, 175, 1159-1163, 1165; See Exhibit A-1, B-1, C-1, Tr. 
132). 
Witness George W. Smith ( Tr. 135, 136, 175) testified: 
"Pursuant to that contract between L. A. 
1\f.arks and the United Bond and Finance Corpora-
tion, I prepared all deeds, bills of sale, assignment 
of leases, to the United Bond and Finance Corpora-
tion, a corporation of the State of Utah. When 
they were presented to Mr. Beckstead, before obtain-
ing the signatures of Mr. and Mrs. Marks, he says, 
'You have got this all wrong. There is no United 
Bond and Finance Corporation about this. This is 
W. R. Beckstead. I want you to draw this deed, 
this bill of sale and these assignments to YV. R. 
Beckstead. It is going to be W. R. Beckstead's 
ranch, and it is nothing to do with the United Bond 
and J1.,inance.' I says, 'Beck, you ought to know 
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~·our business; you ought to kno"" your stockhold-
ers. There has been plPnty of rumpusses going on 
here since the depression "·i th the building and loan 
companies. I nm only a broker, I will do as you 
direct me, if it is all right "Tith lVlr. ~larks', and so 
I rcdrelo these deeds in his individ1tal name) and 
presented them to nlr. ~larks, and he signed them. 
* * * (Tr. 135,136) 
".A.s to the bill of sale of the brands, my infor-
mation tells me the bill of sale to the brands is to 
this "lery day in \V. R. Beckstead. The owner of the 
brands, of the cattle and horse brands, stands in 
the name of ,, ... esley R. Beckstead" ( Tr. 175). 
The Carter Ranch 
The Carter Ranch, located in the same county in 
"Tyoming, and comprising approximately 358 acres of 
land, was likewise purchased with the assets of the United 
Bond and Finance Corporation but deed and title to the 
ranch \vas taken in the name of W. R. Beckstead, indi-
vidually ( Tr. 117 4, 1181, 1182). 
~ The Webb Ranch 
_.1 
.r. 
The YVebb Ranch, comprising about 320 acres of land 
in ,~Vyoming, and including also a leased school section, 
"'as likewise purchased, together "Tith the livestock, ma-
chinery and equipment thereon, with assets of the United 
Bond and J1~inance Corporation, and the contracts and 
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bills of sale and leases 'vere taken in the name of W. R .. 
Beckstead, individually ( Tr. 117 4). 
The Perkins Ranch 
The Perkins Ranch, comprising about 700 acres of 
land in Wyoming, was likewise purchased with assets of 
the United Bond and Finance Corporation. 
THE UNRECORDED .DEED 
When Beesley, Wood & Company, public accountants, 
made an audit of the books of United Bond and Finance 
Corporation they showed and carried as an asset a pur-
ported unrecorded warranty deed from W. R. Beckstead 
and his wife to United Bond and Finance Corporation for 
the Wyoming ranch property ( Tr. 1011). 
In their next audit Beesley, Wood & Company no 
longer carried the title to the vVyoming ranch property in 
the name of United Bond and Finance Corporation but it 
carried the title in the name of Beckstead Livestock Com-
pany, although there was and is no deed from United Bond 
and Finance Corporation conveying title of the Wyoming 
ranch property ( Tr. 813, 814, 1011, 1315). 
Numerous stockholders of the United Bond and Fi-
nance Corporation called at the capitol upon Ezra Gull, 
then director of the Utah Securities Commission, concern-
·•' 
'tl 
Jl 
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ing the taking of title to the V{yoming ranch property in 
the name of Beckstead indicidually -( Tr. 4 75, 4 76). 
'Vhen intervie,Yed by 3Ir. Gull, ~lr. Beckstead stated 
that the \\~yorning property ""~as owned and recorded in 
the name of the lTnited Bond & Finance" (Tr. 474) but in 
an intervie\r occurring some six weeks later Mr. Beckstead 
stated to )lr. Gull that the title to the property had been 
taken and recorded in Beckstead's "own personal name" 
(Tr. 475). 
)lr. Gull remonstrated with Mr. Beckstead and Mr. 
Beckstead said that, 
"he had properly deeded it to the United Bond & 
Finance Company, and those deeds were in the files 
of the corporation, and at the proper time would 
be recorded" (Tr. 476, 477). 
The promised recording has not yet come to pass. 
At the trial demand was made upon Beckstead to pro-
duce in court the alleged or purported deed or deeds from 
himself and wife to United Bond and Finance Corpora-
tion but same ""ere never produced. Apparently th.ey be-
came lost ( Tr. 1315-1317). 
One of the troubles with unrecorded deeds. 
The Densley-Beckstead Sheep 
''rith funds of the United Bond and Finance Corpora-
tion )Jr. Beckstead financed 1\ir. Densley for about $12,-
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000.00 on 2250 head of sheep in Wyoming. l\1r. Beckstead 
took a mortgage on the sheep for the amount of the loan, 
running to himself, individually. The sheep were ear 
1narked with aluminum tags reading, "DENSL·EY & 
BECKSTEAD, LONE TREE, WYOMING" (Tr. 192, 
203, 204). 
The agreement between Beckstead and Densley was 
that these two would split the profits after paying back 
the United Bond and Finance Corporation ( Tr. 203). 
BECKSTEAD LIVESTOCK COMPANY 
Beckstead Livestock Company was incorporated under 
the laws of vVyoming on April 16, 1938 (Tr. 894) with 
50,000 shares of capital stock of the par value of $1.00 
each ( Tr. 823). 
The three incorporators and directors were Wesley 
R. Beckstead, Boyd M. Evans and Benjamin L. Rich (Tr. 
823), Beckstead and Evans being directors and president-
manager and secretary-treasurer, respectively, of the TJnit-
ed Bond and Finance Corporation and Benjamin L. R.ich 
being an attorney at law. 
l\1r. Beckstead testified that Beckstead Livestock Com-
pany was organized "to engage in the raising and sale of 
livestock" and "as a su~sidiary of the United Bond & 
Finance Corporation" ( Tr. 1205). 
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Ho,veYer, )lr. Beck8tead, in \Yriting, directed that one 
share of stoek eaeh be issupd to EYans and to Rich and 
that the remaining -!!1,998 shares be issued to him, V\Tesley 
R. Beckstead ~Exhibit Y-3~ Tr. S2J). 
Boyd )1. Evans, on September 25, 1940 ( Tr. 785), 
testified that immediately after the issuance of the stock 
as directed that he, Beckstead and Rich assigned and trans-
ferred each and all of the shares to United Bond and Fi-
nance Corporation, thus leaving the latter corporation 
"The one sole and only stockholder in the Beckstead r~ive­
stock Company~~ ( Tr. 822, 824, 825). 
""''ith not a single person holding any stock in Beck-
stead Lil"estock Company it 'Yould be most difficult for it 
to function. Who would be qualified to act as a director, 
call a meeting, etc.? 
Attention of the trial court was directed to these facts 
and later, on December 4, 1940 (Tr. 1555, 1621), Boyd M. 
Evans testified that during the noon hour, at 12:45 P. M. 
on September 27, 1940, being during the trial herein ( Tr. 
1624) and two days after he had testified as above, there 
was "a meeting of the Board of Directors" of United Bond 
and I1,inance Corporation (Tr. 1621) at 'vhich "the di-
rectors 'vere all present"; namely, Boyd Evans, Wesley R. 
Beckstead and Leslie D. Spilsbury, following "rhich meet-
ing one share of stock of Beckstead Livestock Company 
"·as issued to each of the three directors of United Bond 
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and Finance Corporation, leaving the remaining 49,997 
shares in the name of the United Bond and Finance Cor-
poration ( Tr. 1621-1623). 
The three qualifying shares have been endorsed in 
blank and delivered back to United Bond and Finance 
Corporation, and Beckstead continues to run the layout as· 
if it were his own ( Tr. 1623). 
The stock certificate book, Exhibit C-4, is somewhat 
irregular and, while apparently only ten ( 10) certificates 
have been issued, yet a number of these certificates and the 
stubs, as well, are missing from the book ( Tr. 1625-1630 ; 
see also 891-895, 897-900, 1205, 1206). 
The certificates "have been lose) ( Tr. 1629; see also 
891-895, 897-900, 1206). 
This suit was commenced in the fore part of August, 
1940, and up to that time the Beckstead Livestock Com-
pany had never had any separate checking or banking ac-
count where funds were deposited or where checks ·were 
dra1vn for the payment of the ranching operations (Tr. 
1630). 
The operating costs and expenses 'Yere paid entirely 
by checks drawn on United Bond and :F,inance Corporation 
up to August 20, 1940, when the Livestock Company, for 
the first time, opened up an account in Wyoming with the 
l\1ountain View Bank ( Tr. 1630). 
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Thus, for OYer 3 years, i.e.,. from l\lay, 1935, to August 
20, 1940, there "~as a constant intermingling of transac-
tions, expenses, assets and moneys of the investment com-
pany \Yith those of the livestock company. 
Audits were not made annually but an audit dated 
April 10, 1940, sho\Ys an operating loss of $4 797.63 for 
1939 for Beckstead Livestock Company ( Tr. 1019). 
The audits of finited Bond and Finance Corporation 
sho"'" an operating loss of $3260.72 for 1938, and also losses 
for 1935 and 1939 ( Tr. 1029). 
THE WILSONS-A TYPICAL CASE 
The \Y"ilson case may be taken as a typical exanrple 
to illustrate to this court the mechanics and tactics em-
ployed by \Vesley R. Beckstead in trading and defrauding 
the stockholders of United Bond and Finance Corporation 
out of their stock ( Tr. 205-241, 250-266, 338-355). 
John L. '':ilson and his wife, ~layme J. Wilson, reside 
at Park City, Utah ( Tr. 205). Both "are just poor day 
working people" ( Tr. 238), l\lr. ''Tilson being employed in 
the mines ( Tr. 254, 255) . 
Prior to the organization of the United Bond and 
Finance Corporation, \V esley R. Beckstead sold the stock 
and investments of l\lutual Savings and Loan and about 
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1923 to 1925 he sold some of the Mutual Savings and Loan 
stock to the Wilsons ( Tr. 225, 235, 252). 
After the organization of the United States Bond and 
Finance Corporation in 1927, Mr. Beckstead contacted the 
VVilsons and traded them out of their holdings in the 
Mutual Savings and Loan, which holdings the Wilsons 
transferred to the United States Bond and Finance Cor-
poration, subscribing for ten (10) units of stock in the 
latter corporation, Mr. Beckstead allowing the vVilsons a 
credit of $457 on the ten units in consideration of the 
transfer ( Tr. 212). 
In addition to the above the Wilsons, through l\ir. 
Beckstead, subscribed for five more units of stock ( Tr. 
206). 
The Wilsons paid $125.00 per unit for the first stock 
subscription and $135.00 per unit for the second (Tr. 206). 
The stock 'vas sold on the installment plan and the Wil-
sons paid $15.00 per month thereon (Tr. 207) until the 
entire fifteen ( 15) units of stock were fully paid for ( Tr. 
226, 227). 
The total sum actually paid by the Wilsons for these 
units was $1975.00 ( Tr. 234). 
The Trade for Investors Thrift Stock 
On October 3, 1931, a Mr. Paradis called at the Wilson 
home and traded the Wilsons out of their block of five ( :l) 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-45-
units in l~nited Bond and l1,inance Corporation, giving 
them~ in ex ... lhange therefor, 8eYen ( 7) units of stock of 
In Yes tors Thrift Corporation ( Tr. 213-215, 220, 227). 
In making the trade )lr. Paradis represented to the 
'Yilsons that Investors Thrift Corporation, 
"was O\Yned by the same company, and they would 
allow us a little extra on making a trade" ( Tr. 227). 
)lr. Paradis, 
"said )lr. Beckstead had this, and it was a little 
better than the other stock; it was owned by the 
same company, and would pay a little better divi-
dends, and allow a little more on the United Bond 
stock that was transferred, turned in for it, or trans-
ferred" ( Tr. 214). 
The Wilsons Had Confidence in Beckstead 
The Wilsons had confidence in Beckstead, 
"because we figured that Mr. Beckstead was a busi-
ness man, and that his business was on the up and 
up, and on the square, and that he was going to do 
just what \vas right by his stockholders" ( Tr. 236). 
Mrs. ~Tilson testified : 
"'-ve are needing the money, and we are hoping 
we can get some now to help us educate our children, 
as \Ye ""ere promised it would be" ( Tr. 232). 
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Again: 
"Well, I always considered Mr. Beckstead as a 
gentleman, and I figure that he has had our interest 
at heart, and meant to do the right thing, and meant 
to help people that were trying to get ahead, and to 
give their children the proper education which they 
should have" ( Tr. 235). 
The Trade for Whiskey Warehouse Receipts 
(Nov. 8) 1935) 
In November, 1935, Mr. Beckstead engaged 0. P. 
Pearce to contact the Wilsons and other stockholders in 
an endeavor to effect a "conversion" of their stock by trad-
ing or exchanging same for whiskey warehouse receipts 
(Tr. 24). 
To this end, Beckstead, on November 8, 1931 (Tr. 262), 
drove Pearce from Salt Lake City to Park City in Beck-
stead's automobile ( Tr. 251) and "on the way up" Beck-
stead told Pearce he had sold the 'V1lsons their original 
Mutual Building and Loan stock; that they had made a 
"conversion" of a part of their United Bond stock for In-
vestors Thrift; that the Wilsons had been slightly discon-
tented and that he (Beckstead) was rather desirous of 
getting their stock ( Tr. 251, 252) . 
Beckstead also gave Pearce to understand that the 
United Bond and Finance and the Investors Thrift "were 
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in a bad condition'~ and that they ~'were practically closed'' 
(Tr. ~33) . 
.. A.rriving at Park l~ity, Beckstead pointed out to 
Pearce the ,, .. ilson home ( Tr. 253) and then went "down 
town .. to " .. ait for Pearce "~ho ""'ent to the Wilson home 
alone ( Tr. 256). 
Pearce testified: 
"\Yhy, I told l\lr. and Mrs. Wilson that I came 
up in behalf of the United Bond, and that-I ex-
plained to them the contents of the problem of 
\\.,.hiskey Warehouse Receipts, and how much better 
it would be for them, the exchange, than to have 
something that w'asn't paying them any dividends 
at that time, and I transferred their account to 
\\"'"hiskey ''r arehouse Receipts" ( Tr. 255). 
On the above representations the Wilsons endorsed 
and turned over to Pearce a part of their stock and exe-
cuted and delivered to him an assignment for the rest of it 
(both Cnited Bond and Investors Thrift) in exchange for 
a receipt left them by Pearce calling for the delivery to 
them at a future date of certain Liquor Warehouse Re-
ceipts ( Tr. 255, 256) . 
Ji.,or making this trade and exchange Beckstead paid 
Pearce $50 by delivering to him United Bond and Finance 
Company's check in that amount (Tr. 262, 263). 
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Beckstead ""vas elated" with this trade (Tr. 257). 
However, after he had obtained possession of the 'Vilson 
stock, properly endorsed, Beckwith desired to be relieved 
of his obligation to deliver to the Wilsons the Whiskey 
Warehouse Receipts to which they were entitled, for the 
reason that it "would be an expenditure of money and 
would cost him money" to obtain such Whiskey Ware-
house Receipts and Beckstead did not favor "an output 
there of the cash" ( Tr. 259, 260). 
Thereupon, and only three days after the above trade, 
Beckstead sent Pearce back to Park City to induce the 
Wilsons to accept stock of American Keene Cement and 
Plaster Company in lieu of the Whiskey Warehouse Re-
ceipts, giving as his reason that the American Keene stock 
was already his property and it would not involve the ex-
penditure of money ( Tr. 259). 
The Trade for American Keene Stock 
(Nov. 11) 1935) 
Pearce, in a Plymouth coupe of the United Bond and 
Finance Corporation supplied by Mr. Beckstead, returned 
to Park City and, on Armistice Day (Nov. 11, 1935), he 
traded the 'Vilsons 1700 shares of Beckstead's American 
Keene Cement and Plaster Company stock for the receipt, 
certificate or contract calling for Whiskey Warehouse Re-
ceipts which Pearce had left with the Wilsons but three 
days previous ( Tr. 260-262, 219, 220). 
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Pearce falsely represented to the ''rilsons that the 
.A.merican Keene stock \Yas worth a dollar a share and that 
the 1700 shares \Yere Yalued at $1700.00 (Tr. 219, 220). 
)Irs. ,, ... ilson testified: 
"" ... e traded on that basis at that time. He said 
it "~as a much better deal, and we wouldn't lose all 
we had turned in; "~e would get about seventeen 
hundred dollars of "~hat we had invested" ( Tr. 220). 
NUMEROUS SUITS PENDING 
Because of this s"Tindle the Wilsons have brought suit 
for recission against the United Bond and Finance Cor-
poration ( Tr. 229). 
The record shows numerous other suits by stockhold-
ers and others against the corporation. 
SWINDLE OF STOCKHOLDERS 
Similar sordid stockholders' stories of swindle were 
related by the witnesses Henry Hoffman ( Tr. 23-7 4), 
Frank H. Johnson (Tr. 75), Pearle L. Jackson, (Tr. 84), 
Ida R. Thurman ( Tr. 100), Ray Hoffman ( Tr. 106; and 
Dr. Frank H. Petty (Tr. 1556). 
Attorney Black, in his cross examination of plaintiffs' 
witness Henry Hoffman quite clearly brought out the fact 
that the stockholders were beat every time they traded 
(Tr. 66). 
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STOCKHOLDERS ARE WITHOUT REMEDY AT LAW 
Numerous stockholders and their representatives have, 
in the past, endeavored to put a stop to the above enumerat-
ed frauds and swindles by laying the facts before various 
officials and agencies, local, state and federal. 
Among the officials so consulted were the following: 
1) Ezra Gp1l, director of the Utah Securities Com-
mission ( Tr. 4 72-520, 565) 
2) Dan B. Shields, the United States District At-
torney ( Tr. 564) 
3) lVIr. Mansfield, the United States Postal Inspec-
tor ( Tr. 564, 565) 
4) lVIr. Wallace and Mr. Roberts, of the county at-
torney's office ( Tr. 561-564, 559) 
5) Numerous private attorneys including Horace J. 
Knowlton ( Tr. 555, 556), and Mr. Skeen of Irvine, 
Skeen & Thurman (Tr. 229-232). 
The Utah Public Service Commission assigned the 
witness Frank 0. Rich to investigate the United Bond and 
Finance Corporation, its subsidiaries, officers and agents, 
and to report to the Commission thereon ( Tr. 567). 
Mr. Gull, as director of the Comn1ission, requested 
l\ir. Beckstead to explain his activities in eonnection with 
dealing in securities in Montana ( Tr. 510). l\1r. Gull testi-
fied that Mr. Beckstead came to Mr. Gull's office at the 
Capitol, 
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Hand he said he didn't think that ·1oas any of my 
business. that he thought I had enough to do in Utah 
\Yithout being concerned over Montana deals, and 
I admitted it, and the conversation "rith respect to 
)Iontana stockholders 'Yas dropped at that time" 
(Tr. 510). 
The other officials, like )lr. Gull, were unable to cope 
"-ith the situation and, having no adeq~tate remedy at law, 
plaintiffs 'vere forced to resort to this suit in equ i,ty to pro-
tect their inYestments and rights, as 'Yell as to protect the 
investments and rights of all other stockholders of the 
United Bond and Finance Corporation . 
... -tfter a long, tedious trial,-after extended argument 
by counsel,-after considering the briefs of counsel and 
the evidence introduced, the trial court granted plaintiffs' 
petition and prayer for relief and ordered the appointment 
of a receiver for the corporation. 
Thus, of all the agencies appealed to by the stock-
holders, a court of equity was the first and only agency to 
accord relief to the hapless and almost hopeless stockhold-
ers of this grossly mismanaged corporation. 
No,Y, on this appeal, this court is asked to set aside 
the decree and undo what a court of equity, in the exercise 
of a sound judicial discretion, has done in an endeavor to 
('Urb the corrupt, fraudulent, systematic and habitual evil 
practices so long indulged. 
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ARGUMENT 
1. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE 
Assignments Nos. 1) 2) 3 and 4 
Appellants apparently find nothing at all disturbing 
in the evidence herein, a resume of which we have recited 
above under the topic heading "The Facts". 
Can it be that appellants have become calloused to the 
deliberate, systematic and habitual evil practices of YVesley 
R. Beckstead? 
"So much a long communion tends 
to make us what we are:" 
THE PRISONER OF CHILLON) Lord Byrom 
And-
"Vice is a monster of so frightful mien, 
As, to be hated, needs but to be seen; 
Yet seen too oft, familiar with her face, 
We first endure, then pity, then embrace." 
ESSAY ON MAN by Alexander Pope 
The evil practices shown by the evidence shocked the 
conscience of the chancellor. 
They will not be approved by nor tolerated in a court 
of equity. 
Thus does the evidence fully support, in all particu-
lars, the decree and findingS' of the trial court (Assign-
ments Nos. 1 and 2; App. Br. pp. 8, 9). 
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The compelling and in1n1ediate need for the appoint-
ment of a receiYer "~as demonstrated and it would have 
been error for the court to haYe done otherwise than deny 
defendants· motion to dismiss made at the conclusion of 
plaintiffs' case (.A.ssignrnents :No.3 (c) and No.4; App. 
Br. pp. 9, 10). 
2. SUFFICIENCY OF THE PLEADINGS 
Assignn1ents Nos. 1 and 2 
In subdi,ision lettered (a) of Assignment No. 1 and 
in subdi 'isions lettered (b), (c) and (d) of Assignment 
No. 2, appellants urge that the decree and findings of fact 
are not supported by the pleadings of the plaintiffs herein 
(.App. Br. pp. 8, 9). 
That such contentions are wholly without merit will 
be disclosed by an examination of the Complaint, Find-
ings and Decree. 
In Stevens v. South Ogden Land Building & Imp. Co., 
lJ litah 232, 47 Pac. 81, at p. 83, this court said: 
"The ends of distributive justice manifested 
by this complaint call for a liberal application of 
the flexible rules of equity." 
In Pitts v. New :\laininoth Gold Min. Co., 23 Utah 
623, 63 Pac. 1076 at p. 1077, this court said: 
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"The application for the appointment of a re-
ceiver is addressed to the sound discretion of the 
court, * -~ "'-. As a general rule, such appointment 
will be made on application therefor in any case 
w:here the interests of the parties appear to req~tire 
it/) (Citing numerous cases; italics ours) 
In Dean v. Shingle, 198 Cal. 652, 246 Pac. 1049, at 
pp. 1051, 1052, the court said : 
"A party cannot be sent out of court merely 
because his facts do not entitle him to relief at law, 
or merely because he is not entitled to relief in 
equity, as the case may be. He can be sent out of 
court only when, upon his facts, he is entitled to no 
relief, either at law or in equity. Consequently, 
an action does not now, as formerly, fail because a 
plain tiff haS' made a mistake as to the form of his 
remedy. If the case which he states entitles him 
to any remedy, either legal or equitable, his com-
plaint is not to be dismissed because he has prayed 
for a judgment to which he is not entitle~. If the 
facts stated are such as address themselves to the 
equity side of the court, the appropriate relief will 
be granted by the court sitting as a court of equity. 
1 Cal. J ur., p. 312, par. 6. 
"In the case at bar, the facts pleaded by the 
plaintiffs clearly address themselves to the equity 
side of the court. The prayer of the complaint is 
for judgment for the specific sum alleged to have 
been lost to the corporation through the misappro-
priation of l\iulford, 'and for such other and further 
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relief n~ ntay be 1neet and appropriate.' The action 
'vas one, therefore, properl~T cognizable in the equity 
side of the court below." 
In People's Bonded Trustee v. '':right, 72 Utah 587, 
272 Pac . .200, at pp. 202, 203, this court said: 
"Pleadings are necessary to invoke the juris-
diction of a court. * * * This does not 1nean, how-
ever, that to sustain jurisdiction the pleadings m,ust 
be free fronl defects or legal objections. If it can 
be gathered fron1 the allegations. either directly or 
,inferentially, that the party was seeking the relief 
granted, or that he was entitled thereto, or if the 
allega-tions tend to shotv, or colorably or inferen-
tially shoto, each material fact necessary to consti-
tute a cause of action, or if the object of the pleader 
can be ascertained fro 1n the allegations, no matter 
hotv defective they are or how rnany necessary ones 
are 01nitted, the court having power to grant the 
relief sought and having the parties before it, the 
judg1nent is not void for lack of jurisdiction. * * * 
"From the pleadings it is clearly inferable, if 
not expressly stated, that the plaintiffs had an in-
terest in the trust property, and by the remedy pro-
posed sought to have it subjected to their claims. 
l t is clear that the action against People's Bonded 
Trustee zoas essentially to subject the trust property 
to the clai~ns of the plaintiffs and other beneficiaries 
of the trnst, and the appointment of the receiver 
1ras a1t(··illary to that purpose. vVe think there were 
ample facts made to appear by the pleadings to in-
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vest the court with jurisdiction to appoint the re-
ceiver, and having the general power to do so in 
such cases, and, the parties being present, the ap-
pointment may not be challenged for lack of juris-
diction) merely because the pleadings are defective/) 
(Italics ours) 
In Riant Amusement Co. v. Bailey, 80 Colo. 65, 249 
Pac .. 7, it was alleged that one Walker who controlled two 
corporations had fraudulently diverted funds of one of 
such corporations to promote and establish the other. The 
trial court appointed a receiver and in sustaining its right 
to do s:o, the Supreme Court of Colorado said: 
"It appears, they say, that the arrears of taxes, 
principal, and interest have been paid, and future 
maturities will be met; that the property is yield-
ing rent, all and more than it is worth; that the 
decree forbids its diversion; and that a receiver not 
only cannot make the matter any safer but might 
not even be able to rent the property so well, and 
would certainly add to the expense. These argu-
ments are very strong and might convince us if "·e 
"rere the trial court, but) to leave the matter in de-
fendant)s hands would) under this record) be equiva-
. lent to rnaking vValker a receiver without bond, and 
it is not unlikely that the court considered sucl1 n 
course 1vouJd be indiscreet becattse hardly consistent 
with its recent decree b.ased on a finding that 1l7 alkcr 
had wrongfully diverted funds. We cannot say, 
therefore, that the district court abused its discre-
tion." ( Italics ours) 
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In Ellis v. Panther Oil & Gns Co., 171 Okl. 552, 43 P. 
(2d) J23 at p. J2J, the court said: 
~~The 'Ye 11-settled rule in this state is that, when 
a party applying for the appointment of a receiver, 
pendente lite, has made a showing entitling him, 
upon some recognized rule, to have a receiver ap-
pointed, it is n·ithin the sound judicial discretion of 
tlze trial court as to zrlletlzer a receiver should br 
appointed/, and this court 1rill refuse to interfere 
1tnless it is clearly shon·n that there has been an 
abnse of such discretion/) (Citing numerous cases) 
"In the case of .A .. nglo-American Royalties Cor-
poration -v. Brentnall, 167 Okl. 305, 29 P. (2d) 120, 
121, this court said: 'The trial court is clothed with 
judicial discretion in the appointment of a receiver. 
He should further consider, and himself review, the 
matter on a motion to vacate his former order ap-
pointing a receiver. This the trial court did and 
denied the motion to vacate. On appeal the burden 
is on the defendant to show the error in the action 
of the trial court. The defendant presents his at-
tack upon three grounds, but they are not sustained. 
In this case the trial court had jurisdiction to ap-
point a receiver, the allegations and proof were 
sufficient to justify and sustain the appointment of 
a receiver, and the action of the trial court in deny-
ing the defendant's motion to vacate the appoint-
ment of receiver is affirmed'." (Italics ours) 
In Bryan v. ''Teich, (C.C.A. 10) 74 F. (2d) 964, at p. 
970, the court said: 
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"A court of equity by virtue of its general 
eqttitable jurisdiction at a suit of a stockholder on 
the ground of fraud, mismanagement, waste and 
dissipation of assets by the corporate officers, may 
appoint a receiver for the corporation to collect, pro-
tect, and preserve its assets and to continue its busi-
ness, and thereafter, when there has been a change 
of corporate officers or it appears prudent so to do, 
may restore its property and affairs to its duly con-
stituted corporate authorities." (Italics ours) 
See also to same effect : 
Hall v. Nieukirk, 12 Idaho 33, 85 Pac. 485; 
Horejs v. American Plumbing & Steam 8. Co., 161 
Wash. 586, 297 Pac. 759, 761; 
Supreme Sitting of the Order of Iron Hall v. Baker, 
134 Ind. 293, 33 N. E. 1128, 1135; 
In re I.Jewis, 52 Kan. 660, 35 P. 287, 288, 289; 
Haywood v. Lincoln Lbr. Co., 64 Wis. 639, 26 N. W. 
184, 186; 
Ashton v. Penfield, 233 Mo. 391, 135 S. W. 938, 946; 
State v. Shelton, 238 Mo. 281, 143 S. ,V. 417, 421; 
Ponca l\Iill Co. v. Mikesell, 55 Neb. 98, 75 N. "'\V. 
46, 4 7; 
Culver Lbr. Co. v. Culvers, 81 Ark. 102, 99 S. vV. 
391, 395; 
Davis v. U. S. Elec. P. & L. Co., 77 Md. 35, 25 A. 
982, 984; 
Gibbs: v. Morgan, 9 Iowa 100, 72 Pac. 733, 737; 
Aiken v. Colorado R. Irr. Co., (C. C. Cal.) 72 F. 591. 
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3. CONDUCT OF TRIAL COURT 
... -lss-ig n1n c n t 1-·l o. 3 
Hard pressed for a defense and having neither the 
facts, the la"T nor the equities \Yith them, the appellants 
have taken refuge in the "Tilderness of the most technical 
and refined rules of pleading, practice and procedure. 
So fearful "Tere defendants of facing the facts at the 
t·rial, and so apprehensive \Yere they of the outcome, that 
they filled the record with myriad technical objections, 
many of ,v·hich were as broad as a scatter gun charge. 
~fuch of the time of the busy trial court was consumed 
in listening to arguments of counsel and in ruling on such 
wholesale objections to the admission of the testimony. 
Throughout the trial the learned judge displayed 
courtesy, patience and tolerance. 
To expedite the disposition of the cause and to accom-
modate counsel and witnesses for both parties, and with 
considerable personal inconvenience and hardship, the 
court held numerous night sessions during the trial. 
At the very outset of the case the defendants present-
ed themselves at the hearing of this cause without having 
filed any verified pleadings, and therefore, without having 
l'aiNed any issue of fact. ·yvhen attention was called to 
the faet that the burden of proof would not shift until the 
filing of verified pleadings, the trial court considerately 
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indulged defendants and ordered a recess in order to give 
defendants an opportunity to prepare and file the required 
pleadings (Tr. 2-10). 
At the conclusion of the recess defendants served on 
plaintiffs and filed a demurrer to plaintiffs' complaint, and 
also their written return which served as the answer of 
defendants, and thereupon the court proceeded to hear 
the evidence ( Tr. 10-14). 
Numerous like instances demonstrating the patience, 
consideration and tolerance of the trial judge for defend-
ants appear throughout the record. 
Notwithstanding these facts, appellants, as Assign-
ment No. 3, broadly make the harsh and extravagant 
general charge that the trial court was prejudiced against 
them and that they "were not given and afforded a fair 
and impartial trial" ( App. Br. pp. 9, 203-235). 
Appellants have devoted thirty-two pages of their 
brief ( 203-235) in a futile attempt to relate a single specific 
instance w"ith which to substantiate the above general 
charge. 
G. A. Paradis "Connected Up" 
Appellants, at pp. 205, 206, urge that the judge "Tas 
prejudiced is demonstrated by his refusal to strike out 
fron1 the testimony of the witness ~Irs. Wilson the state-
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~ ment~ and reprPsentntions n1a{le to her by G. A. Paradis 
to induce her, and \Yhieh did induce her, to trade him her 
l .. nited Bond stoek for stock of Investors Thrift. 
Defendants contend that there "'"as and is no connec-
tion bet1reen G .. A .. Paradis and defendants and for that 
L reason that the representation he made to Mrs. Wilson 
~ were but hearsay as to them. 
The ans·w·er to this "'"eak and idle argument is found 
in the record which shows that in October, 1931, upon ap-
plications made to the Utah Securities Commis:sion, by 
both l~nited Bond and Finance Corporation and Investors 
Thrift Corporation, that two separate licenseS: were issued 
by the Commission to G .. A ... Paradis to represent such cor-
porations (Tr. -!T0-471; Exhibits N-2 and 0-2). 
To )Irs. n;ilson, at Park City (Tr. 212-217) and to 
Henry Hoffman, at Randolp·h (Tr. 31-37), G. A. Paradis, 
to induce them to trade their respective units of stock in 
United Bond for stock of Investors Thrift, held himself 
out as the representative of Beckstead and of Beckstead's 
t\YO companies, and he exhibited to Henry Hoffman cre-
dentials issued to him by them to prove his authority ( Tr. 
31-37, 212-217). 
The testimony of the defendant Boyd Evans and the 
stock record book of the United Bond and Finance Corpo-
ration show that the respective certificates of stock, out 
of wl1ich G. 1\. Paraf~is traded ~Iayme Wilson and Henry 
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Hoffman, were delivered to United Bond, and that after 
holding same in the "little pouch" for over eight years they 
were finally, and on January 10, 1940, reissued to United 
Bond in its big "jack pot" certificate, No. 872 ( Tr. 865-
867). 
In connecting up G. A. Paradis with the defendants 
and their systematic and habitual evil practices, William 
L. Christensen, a former director, secretary-treasurer, and 
bookkeeper of both United Bond (Tr. 16, Exhibit A) and 
of Investors Thrift ( Tr. 18, Exhibit B), was called as a 
witness on behalf of plaintiffs and examined ( Tr. 654, 678). 
Christensen proved to be a hostile, reluctant and 
evasive witness. He would not identify or connect up G. 
A. Paradis as a representative of either corporation, nor 
would he assist in interpreting some of the records of In-
vestors Thrift which had been lost by defendants and 
found and produced in court by plain tiffs. 
His entire examination and testimony was so highly 
satisfactory to defendants that they did not risk even a 
single, solitary question on him on cross-examination and 
the finis to his testimony is written in the record as fol-
lows: 
"Mr. Adair: You may inquire. 
Mr. Roberts: No cross examination. 
The Court: That is all, Mr. Christensen. ("Tit-
ness excused. ) " ( Tr. 678) 
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'Vhy, then, should appellants devote three pages of 
their brief ( ::!~2, :!~3, ~~-!) in quoting the eYasive answers 
of the 'Yitness Christensen to questions put to him by the 
trial court in an honest endeavor to ascertain the truth? 
The trial judge had no better luck with Christensen 
than had plaintiffs' counsel. 
There is nothing here to show prejudice on the part 
of the trial judge and it is certain that no harm or pre-
judice "Tas done to defendants' cause by any of the testi-
mony of former officer ,,~illiam Christensen, who properly 
should have been named as a defendant in these proceed-
ings "Then they "\Yere started. 
Despite appellants' contentions to the contrary, we 
submit that G. A. Paradis is shown by the record to have 
been rather intimately "connected up". 
C. R. Jones "Connected Up" 
Appellants devote nine pages of their brief ( 210-218) 
in reviewing the testimony of the witness Frank C. Rich. 
Appellants urge that the trial judge demonstrated 
prejudice against them in permitting Rich "to detail con-
versations bet,veen himself and others not in any way re-
Jnotely connected trith the corporation or any of these de-
fcndant.s'' ( ... \pp. Br. 215). 
The first of these conversations mentioned and quoted 
was with one C. R. Jones (App. Br. 215-217). 
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Why should appellants urge that C. R. Jones is not 
in any way remotely connected with the corporation or any 
of these defendants? 
What says the record about Mr. Jones? 
C. R. Jones was a director of the United Bond and 
Finance Corporation and, on November 6, 1934, he filed 
in the clerk's office of Salt Lake County his oath of affir-
mation as such director (Exhibit A; Tr. 14, 16, 487, 488). 
In 1936, in which year United Bond and Finance Cor-
poration withdrew from the State of Montana, C. R. Jones 
was then director of that corporation and his name appears 
as such on the corporation's withdrawal papers filed in 
the office of the Secretary of State of l\1ontana (See Exhibit 
certified by Secretary of State of Montana). 
C. R. Jones is an incorporator, director and the presi-
dent of American Keene Cement and Plaster Company 
(Exhibit D, Tr. 21, 1266, 1267). 
C. R. Jones is secretary of Jones Investment Company 
"r hose office is the same office occupied by the American 
Keene Company (Tr. 1517). 
C. R. Jones and Grant I.J. Crandall traded with W. R. 
Beckstead certificate No. 19 for 5000 shares and certificate 
No. 22 for 6,800 shares (a total of 11,800 shares) of stock 
in .American Keene for one share each of the voting stock 
of United Bond, represented by certificates Nos. 134 and 
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135 ~ Tr. 13~1. 15~3, 1328, 1533), and five shares each of 
Common Class 11 stock ( Tr. 1332). 
These 11,800 sha1·es of stock in 1-~merican Keene Ce-
ment and Plaster l~ornpany 'Yere next used to trade the 
stockholders of both United Bond and Investors Thrift out 
of their holdings ( Tr. 40-50, 54:-59, 63, 72, 80-83, 89-91, 
113-119, 1~3-1~3. 1099, 1272-1285, 14:20, 1421, 1507-1515, 
1518, 1520-15~8, 1572, 1588-1598, 1605-1607) . 
lTpon complaints made to Utah Securities Commission 
respecting the trading of American Keene for United Bond, 
~lr. Gull, of the Commission, interviewed C. R. Jones, who 
said ( Tr. 4:88) : 
"I appreciate the difficulties of this type of a 
transaction, and I am a director of the company, 
and also a personal friend of Mr. Beckstead's, and 
have great confidence in him. Another of my di-
rectors is also Mr. Crandall, who is a brother-in-law 
of Mr. Beckstead's, and we would like to talk to 
Mr. Beckstead to see whether we can't straighten 
this out, without your taking any action" ( Tr. 488). 
)fr. Gull testified further ( Tr. 489 ) : 
"Yes, I particularly asked Mr. Jones if he was 
trying to float an issue of stock for the American 
Keene Plaster & Cement. He said, 'I have been 
getting an issue ready, but this is Beckstead) s do-
ings. and is not a deal of the American Keene, and 
I don't ""ant you to hold my com.pany responsible 
for any of these deals' '' ( Tr. 489). 
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Thus has C. R. Jones been rather intimately "con-
nected up" despite appellants' brief. 
No sound corporation and no intelligent, responsible 
and trustworthy officers would countenance· the stock 
juggling and trading which were indulged in by Beck-
stead's brother-in-law, Grant L. Crandall and by C. R. 
Jones in connection with the systematic and habitual evil 
practices of Beckstead. 
The trial court appreciated the fact that these men 
"\\rere not only in bad company but that they were in bad 
business as well. 
The trial judge sat as a court of equity. It was to 
ascertain the truth that the court sent to the clerk's office 
for a court file containing prior litigation and it was this 
same motive which prompted the court's interrogation 
of the witness Grant L. Crandall, of which appellants 
complain at pages 229 to 233 of their brief. 
The court had a perfect right in this equity case to 
make the inquiries which it made and defendants have 
no cause for complaint here for the reason that their rights 
were in nowise or manner prejudiced thereby. 
This suit is to be decided upon the substantial eYi-
dence which has been properly introduced herein. It is 
not to be determined by the technicalities urged by de-
fendants, nor by the amount of evidence which defendants 
'""ere able to exclude from the record. 
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A. W. Madsen "Connected Up" 
.A.t pages 218 to 2~2 of appellants' brief they assert 
that the "itness .A .. ,, .... :\Iadsen ''"~as never at any time 
associated with any of the defendants in any capacity 
whatsoever''. 
In the first place the testimony of A. W. Madsen, 
whether "yholly in or out of the record, did not and will 
not influence the final outcome of this case in any par-
ticular. 
)Iadsen and his testimony are entirely too unimpor-
tant to warrant devoting five pages of appellants' brief 
thereto (App. Br. 218-222). 
)Iadsen, so far as this appeal is concerned, is just 
another "red herring" dragged across the trail. 
A. W. )Iadsen is the stock "picker" who last appears 
on the scene. It was ~ladsen who, but a few brief months 
before this suit was instituted, journeyed to Livingston, 
)fontana, "yhere he "picked up" the Pogliano units of 
United Bond stock, which stock wa~ promptly acquired 
by Beckstead and, on January 6, 1940, transferred and 
reissued to TJnited Bond in its big "jack pot" certificate 
No. 872. 
Beckstead testified that he had on a few occasions 
purchased Cnited Bond stock from A. W. Madsen (Tr. 
1311-1312). 
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Madsen admits having worked in Montana with one 
Egbert Pandolfo, another stock "picker" ( Tr. 635). In 
that connection Madsen testified ( Tr. 635, 636) : 
"Q. And did you work for Pandolfo? 
A. For a short period of time, about three 
weeks. 
Q. And in that connection, did you have, or 
were you furnished any list of investors in the Unit-
ed Bond and Finance Corporation? 
A. I was furnished, by Mr. Pandolfo, a list of 
various securities" ( Tr. 635, 636). 
From the foregoing, and in view of Beckstead's pur-
chase and reissue of the Pogliano stock, after being ex-
pressly directed by Pogliano not to transfer same, it would 
be a legitimate inference that A. W. l\Iadsen, Jack Old-
royd and W. R. Beckstead were rather closely "connected 
up" on a most questionable stock transaction ( Tr. 1311-
1313). 
Beckstead, concerning other purchases of United Bond 
stock direct from A. W. Madsen, testified (Tr. 1312): 
"Well, we bought two or three times direct 
from him. 
Q. And you don't know what he traded for 
that stock, do you? 
A. I don't know anything about it. 
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Q. 1-\nd you do know no"'" that Pogliano isn't 
satisfied "·ith his trade, don't you, "'"ith him? 
A. I atn not 1lfr. Pogliano)s guardian. 
Q. :X o. .A .. nd you never did tell Mr. Pogliano, 
and haven't to this day told l\ir. Pogliano that, after 
you recei"led this letter from him, of October 16th, 
that you turned right around and disregarded his 
request not to issue the stock, but bought it your-
self, direct. You haYe never told Mr. Pogliano that, 
have you? 
A. I haven't seen Mr. Pogliano .. 
Q. No, and you haven't written him to that 
effect, have you? 
... ~. I don't think so." ( Tr. 1312) 
Cross Examination of 0. P. Pearce 
The cross examination of the witness 0. P. Pearce 
by defendants' counsel was most exhaustive. 
The first question put to him was whether he had 
been convicted of a felony and he replied in the affirmative. 
On cross examination of Mr. Pearce defendants' coun-
sel read into the record, almost in its entirety, a purported 
deposition of )lr. Pearce alleged to have been theretofore, 
and on January 17, 1939, taken (Tr. 332). 
This purported deposition, over plaintiffs' objections, 
was read into the record on the promise defendants made 
to the court to "connect up". 
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In overruling one ,of the plaintiffs' objections to the 
reading of this: alleged deposition, the court observed ( Tr. 
337): 
"Counsel assures me that it is material. If he 
connects up I will let it remain in the record" (Tr. 
337). 
The statements set forth in tbe purported deposition 
were at no time "connected up" nor did defendants at 
any time lay the foundation for any impeachment of 
Pearce, for the simple reason that the alleged deposition 
was not at variance, on any material point, with the evi-
dence which he gave while on the witness stand at the 
trial of this case. 
Page upon page of .this "rholly inadmissible document 
were read into the record by defendants' counsel, and when 
defendants had finished their cross examination of J\ir. 
Pearce he was excused from the stand. 
When plaintiffs' counsel thereafter concluded that 
they had no further need for Mr. Pearce's attendance they 
requested the court to excuse him. 
It was not until then that appellants made any sug-
gestion that they cared to interrogate the witness Pearce 
any further. 
If after plaintiffs had finished with this witness, and 
defendants had completed their crosS' examination of him, 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-71-
defendants had complPted their cross examination of him, 
defendants still desired the 'Yitness to remain in attend-
ance, that "-as their privilege, in fact, they could have sub-
lit poenaed him and he 'yould have been required to remain 
1( over in Salt Lake. However, he would have so remained 
over at the expense of the defendants "rho needed him and 
not at the expense of the plaintiffs 'vho had finished with 
him, and that is the effect of the court's ruling of which 
the appellants complain at pages 206-208 of their brief . 
... :\sa matter of fact, the record shows that the witness 
did remain over long after the above had occurred and that 
on December ±, 1940, when the witness Dr. Frank H. Petty 
"-as testifying that Pearce "~as again called to the witness 
stand, "~here he testified on direct, on cross, on re-direct, 
and that he was finally interrogated on re-cross examina-
tion by Mr. Black, and that such re-cross examination con-
cluded as follows : 
"Q. And you knew all of those things at the 
time you talked to Mr. Petty? 
A. That is right. 
Mr. Black : That is all. 
Mr. Adair: That is all. That is our case, your 
Honor. 
The Witness: Is that all? 
l\fr. Adair: That is all. 
The Court: Does the plaintiff rest? 
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Mr. Adair : The plain tiff rests. 
The Court : vV e will take the afternoon recess 
at this time." ( Tr. 1613, 1614) 
Why, in the face of such a record, should appellants 
leave the inference with this. court that the trial court had 
denied them "an opportunity to supply the required foun-
dational testimony" ( App. Br. 208) ? 
Defendants were furnished with every "opportunity 
to supply the required foundational testimony" ( App. Br. 
208). Their difficulty was the absence of any facts or 
testimony on which to base an impeachment. 
Speaking of impeachments, may we not revie'v the 
impeachment of Mr. Beckstead? 
Impeachment of Beckstead 
Under oath, at various times, Beckstead has· given 
various testimony regarding the o\vnership, transfer and 
disposal of the 11,800 shares of American Keene stock. 
"We Sold Him" the Stock 
On September 26, 1940, upon his direct examination 
by his own counsel, Beckstead stated that he had sold the 
American Keene stock to Mr. Pearce, testifying (Tr. 1087, 
1088) : 
II 
!r.l 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-73-
H,, ... ell, u.,e sold him) I think it was 11,800 shares 
of American Keene Plaster stock, for seventeen 
hundred dollars. 
~lr. Adair: How many shares? 
The -n""itness: 11,800. 
)lr. Adair: 11,800 . 
. A.. (Continued:) And we sold him this stock 
on open account'• ( Tr. 1087, 1088). 
On September 30, 1940, "\Yhen interrogated on cross 
examination by plaintiffs" counsel, Beckstead testified 
(Tr. 1271) : 
"""'"ell, that is the way it was handled. The 
sixty-eight hundred shares, and the five thousand 
shares was sold to Pearce for seventeen hundred. 
dollars. 
Q. In other words, Pearce paid, or agreed to 
pay, and an account was opened for him, seventeen 
hundred dollars, for eleven thousand eight hundred 
shares? 
A. Yes sir." (Tr. 1271) 
"I Gave It Away" 
On 1\larch 4, 1938, in a deposition taken before a no-
tary public, l\lr. Beckstead testified that he gave the stock 
au·ay ( Tr. 1275-1277, 1279, 1281, 1282) : 
"Q. Do you have a record of American Keene 
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Plaster and Cement Company stock owned by you 
at any time during 1935, or any time prior thereto? 
A. I don't know of any record. 
Q. Do you own any such stock? 
A. At one time I owned some stock. 
Q. When? 
A. In 1935, I think. 
Q. And what did you do with that stock? 
A. I gave it away. 
Q. You gave it away. T·o whom did you give it? 
A. I gave it to 0. P. Pearce. 
Q. You gave it to 0. P. Pearce, and you in-
structed him to go out and trade it for United Bond 
and Finance Company stock? 
A. No sir. 
Q~ Did you know he was_ trading it for United 
Bond and Finance Company stock? 
A. Not particularly. 
Q. Was it ever transferred in his name? 
A. I don't know. 
Q. Didn't he report back to you that he was 
making trades, at that time,. of American Keene 
Plaster and Cement Company stock? 
A. I don't know as we ever discussed it. 
Q. With United Bond and Finance· Company 
stock, will you say you didn't discuss it with hin1? 
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A. I don)t know. 
Q. Did yon discuss that? 
.A.. I don't know. 
Q. " 7111 you say you did not? 
.A.. No. I say I don)t remember ever discussing 
it with him. 
Q. " ... ill you say you never did? 
.A.. I don)t kHozc.') (Tr~ 1275, 1276) 
* * .. 
Q. Just answer the question, you paid 0. P. 
Pearce $5.00 a unit to go out and get this stock? 
A. I didn't send him out .. 
Q. You paid him for bringing it in on that 
basis? 
A. I didn't instruct him to bring it in. 
Q. You furnished American Keene Plaster 
and Cement Company stock to- make the trade with, 
you personally? 
A. I gave him some stock.') ( Tr. 1277) 
* * * 
A. Well, my answer would be this : I gave 
him the American Keene from my personal hold-
ings) and what he was going to do with it, I don't 
know." (Tr. 1279) 
* * * 
Q. Did you ever have any talk with him, or 
conversation with him as to what he was to do with 
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the American Keene Plaster and Cement Company 
s:tock? 
A. It didn't concern me, because I gave it to 
him/} ( Tr. 1279) 
* * * 
Q. But you want us now to understand you 
made Mr. Pearce a present o1 that stock} and he 
went out and made trades, and brought it back, 
and sold it to you? 
A. Yes." ( Tr. 1281) 
* * * 
Q. Did you personally acquire any stock dur-
ing that time in return for your American Keene 
Plaster stock, through Mr. Pearce, or anybody else? 
A. No sir, I gave that stock away. 
Q. Gave what stock away? 
A. The American Keene Plaster and Cement 
Company stock that was is:sued in my name, I gave 
that to Mr. Pearce/) (Tr. 1282) 
Such testimony prompted the court to observe, 
"Now, we have got three stories in the record with 
respect to this stock. What is the court going to 
believe" ( Tr. 1421)? 
The observation of the chancellor was apt. 
It was true. It evidences no prejudice whatever. 
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A Problem in Arithmetic 
At pages ~06 and ~07 of their brief appellants com-
plain of the ruling "?hereby the trial court put an end to 
an wrgunlentatirc cross c.ranlinntion ill arithn1etic of the 
w"itness Pearce based on hypothetical figures furnished the 
witness by appellants~ counsel ( Tr. 406-409). 
On 'Yhat possible theory are such arithmetic problems 
proper cross examination or admissible? 
It is asserted at page 206 of appellants' brief that 
Pearce """orked on a commission basis of $5.00 per unit", 
hence if 87 units "?ere sold, 1chich facts are not in evidence) 
it would be but simple arithmetic to compute the total 
commission at $435. 
"Half Statement"-Piece-meal Reading of Deposition 
.A.t page 210 of their brief appellants urge that the 
trial court's "charge of reading a 'half statement' is posi-
tively unfair as surely appears from the record". 
"The attitude of the trial Court" during counsel's 
piecemeal reading of the purported deposition of Pearce 
throughout his cross examination could have been much 
more "clearly shown and indicated" had appellants sup-
plemented their "half statement" of the record, by quoting 
the three succeeding pages of the record commencing at 
the very place and page where appellants' quotation ended 
(Reporter's Tr. 392-394; official Tr. 621-623) viz.: 
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"The Court: Well-
~lr. Black : Starting down to the bottom, the 
last question, to fix the time. 
The Court : I don)t know how~ that fixes any 
time. 
Mr .. Black: Well, your Honor, of course-
The Court: The only interest I have is-I don't 
want to direct your cross examination. 
Mr. Black : No. 
The Court: If we are going to save any time 
by not going into useless matters, where you are 
endeavoring to impeach a witness, and reading 
matters which would confirm his testimony, we 
shouldn't pursue that course. 
Mr. Black: I will assure the court I want to 
save time; I am just as- busy as anybody. 
Mr. Adair : I think Mr. Black is reading his 
deposition here in the hope they may conflict with 
his questions, that I don't think that is proper, and 
it isn't proper impeachment. 
The Court: True enough, the deposition isn't 
admissible; conflicting statements might be ad-
missible. 
Mr. Adair: Nine out of ten of the answers 
confirm the witness. 
Mr. Black : There hasn't been any confirma-
tion yet. 
The Court: Go ahead, Mr. Black. I want you 
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to use your Olen judgment, but I think that if we 
can be economical "~ith our time, we are going to 
get this thing over some day. 
~lr. Black: Your Honor, this witness, I sup-
pose. is one of the important ones. 
The Court: I am not in any way restricting you. 
l\lr. Black: Thank you, your Honor. 
Q. Mr. Pearce, you tell the court wherein 
there "~as any agreement, in that first conversation, 
to pay you fiye dollars for this United Bond and 
Finance Company, per unit. 
)lr. Adair: -nT e object to that as calling for a 
conclusion. He is asking him if there wasn't an 
agreement. 
~lr. Black: This is cross examination, and I 
have a right to call for conclusions. 
The Court: The objection is overruled. 
A. In the first conversation at Beckstead's 
dffi.ce? 
Q. Yes. 
A. There was nothing said like that. 
Q. There was nothing said there at that time? 
A. In the first meeting. 
Q. That was the time you discussed the Whis-
key ,-varehouse Receipts, wasn't it? 
A. That is the first, yes. 
Q. And so, when you testified in your deposi-
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tion that, ''Vhat, if anything was said as to the 
basis of your compensation?', and you answered: 
'Five dollars per unit for United Bond and Finance 
and two and a half for the Investors Thrift', you 
didn't refer to that first conversation? 
A. Not the first conversation, no. May I read 
ahead of that? You are just jumping from page to 
page) Mr. Black. 
Q. Certaintly, I can't read it all to you? 
A. No, I don't wish to. It doesn)t say any-
thing about any time or place here. 
Q. Let's see if it doesn't. Read that question 
before there, and see what it says there. 
A. All right. 
Q. I read it to you in the first place. 
A. Show me the time and place. I would like 
to have you show it to the court. I fail to read it. 
Q. "Just state fully the conversation between 
yourself and Mr. Beckstead as to the matter of 
effecting these trades by which the United Bond and 
Finance Company and the Investors Thrift Stock, 
owned by individuals, would be taken up by you-" 
A. Yes. 
Q. "Q. What you were to give for it, and 
how you would do it?' 
A. Yes, but that doesn)t say anything about 
the tinte and place) Mr. Black/) (Tr. 392-394) 
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Thus, counsel \Yns called ;-the \Yitness won ;-and 
the matter dropped. 
The piecemeal reading of the purported deposition 
made it most difficult for the \Yitness as well as for the 
court and counsel to follow, as is illustrated by the follow-
ing excerpts from the record: 
".A.. ~lay I see the proceedings) and the after 
part of that) so I can qualify my statement. I don)t 
knoze what pa.rt you are referring to. 
Q. I am referring to the questions and an-
swers . 
. A... ""\V"'" ell, is this referring to any particular 
part? I would Uke to read above and below. 
Q. I want to know if he asked him tho8e 
questions. 
The Court: He may not be able to identify 
those questions and answ,ers without knowing the 
context of it appearing before and after. Do you 
recall having had those questions asked to you, 
and having given those answers? 
A. Why, there was so many questions, your 
Honor-
The Court: I say, do you recall those questions 
asked and those answers being given.? 
A. No. 
The Court: That is sufficient, then." ( Tr. 348, 
349). 
* * * 
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"Q. Calling your attention to the deposition, 
I will ask you to state whether or not at that time 
the following questions 'Yere addressed to you by 
your counsel, or by counsel, Mr. Skeen, and the 
answers made by yourself? 
Mr. Adair: What page is that? 
Mr. Black : There is no page here on it. 
The Court: It follows. 
Mr. Black: It is page 9, your Honor, back up 
underneath here. 
Mr. Daines: What page did you read from 
before, Mr. Black? 
Mr. Black: Well, I can't understand that, your 
Honor. It is marked Page 8. Maybe this is 19. 
These pages, if the court please, I can't quite read 
them. You see, there is page 3, but this page over 
here is further back. 
(Further statements of respective counsel.)" 
(Tr. 349) 
* * * 
"Were those questions addressed to you? 
A. They presumably were addressed to me, 
yes, sir. 
Q. Were those answers made by you? 
A. They were made by myself, but-
Mr. Black: Your Honor, I am content with the 
answer. 
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)Ir. 1-\dair: I think he is entitled to his ex-
planation. 
The Court: That may be so, but that is a mat-
ter of redirect examination." (Tr. 352) 
* * * 
HQ. Is that your testimony? 
A. That is misleading testimony, Mr.-not 
the 'vay-
)Ir. Adair: Just a moment. 
~Ir. Black: I don't care about that, or not. 
Q. Did you testify that way, or not? 
~lr. Adair: \Ve will ask questions here. I think 
I should be permitted to ask him a few questions 
here, to find whether that had ever been signed by 
him. I think the law provides for a reading over by 
the witness, and subscription by him, of the deposi-
tion. 
The Court: It provides that he should sign and 
subscribe the deposition. 
nlr. Black: This is a different case entirely, 
your Honor. It couldn't be published here. I am 
just asking him if he didn't so testify at that time. 
The Court: But even so, in order that it might 
be used at all, that it would be competent for pur-
poses of impeachment, if you are using it as a 
deposition-
nlr. Black: I am not using it as a deposition. 
I am bringing it for the purposes of impeachment. 
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The Court : The court n~ust know w·hether you 
are using it as a deposition. 
Mr. Black: No, I am just using it here as im-
peachment. 
The Court: That, perhaps, is the situation here, 
Mr. Adair, and the questions that you would like 
to ask on voir dire would very likely be proper 
questions to ask on redirect." (Tr. 363, 364) 
* * * 
"Did you testify so? 
A. You are twisting the forepart, when I first 
started to work with Beck. After I started to work-
Q. All I am asking you is if that is a part of 
your examination at that time? 
A. Well, your Honor, I refuse to answer a 
question like that, because it is involving one part 
of the-
The Court: Mr. Pearce, you can answer that 
question, whether you so testified. If it is an ulti-
mate interpretation counsel for plaintiff can 
straighten it out. (Tr. 384-385) 
* * * 
"Was that your testimony at that time? 
A. Evidently it is, yes sir. There isn)t dis-
crepancies there/) ( Tr. 390) 
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Stockholders Seek Assistance of Public Officials 
The ''"itness (}eorge ,Y. Smith testified that he first 
prepared all deeds, bills of sale and assignments pertaining 
to the sale of the )larks property in ,-Vyoming running 
directly to and in the name of lTnited Bond and Finance 
Corporation, but that at the direction of W. R. Beckstead 
he redrew all the deeds and papers in the name of and 
running to ,-Y. R. Beckstead, indicidually ( Tr. 135, 136). 
On cross examination of the witness Smith concerning 
the above transaction appellants put the following question 
to him ( Tr. 167) : 
"\Vhy didn't you go down and tell the County 
.. Attorney about it?" ( Tr. 167) 
Evidently at that time counsel for appellants deemed 
it proper to lay such facts before the County Attorney for 
action. 
By the time appellants prepared their brief for this 
court, however, their attitude apparently had undergone 
a decided change for they now, at pages 210 to 215 of their 
brief, urge that to admit in evidence what the stockholders 
and their agents told the County Attorney and other public 
officials, and such action as was taken by them was and is 
Yiolative of "all rules of materiality, competency and rele-
vancy" ( App. Br. 211). 
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The testimony so complained of by appellants is ma-
terial for it shows that before starting this action the 
stockholders had exhausted the usual and ordinary rem-
edies provided by law without obtaining any relief what-
ever and it further establishes as a fact that they have no 
adequate remedy at law and that by reason thereof they 
may appeal to a court of equity for relief as they have done. 
Court Assisted in Production of Lost Contract 
When Beckstead testified that he was not able to 
locate and therefore could not produce in court the original 
written contract which he entered into with Lauren ,V. 
Gibbs for the purchase of an insurance agency, the trial 
judge assisted the defendant out of his difficulty by send-
ing to the clerk of the court's office and obtaining a copy 
of the contract from one of the court files. 
Why should appellants resent the finding and produc-
tion by the court of a correct copy of the document which 
they lost and were unable to produce (App. Br. 236)? 
Surely appellants would not "rilfully conceal this Ina-
terial evidence, nor would they desire a chancellor, sitting, 
as he does, in a court of equity, having personal knowledge 
of the existence of material evidence, to conceal its where-
abouts from the parties litigant and from counsel. 
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The Impounding of Assets 
Plaintiffs in their complaint pray for ~injuncti-ve relief 
and expressly req nest the court to restrain the defendant 
\Y. R. Beckstead from disposing of any assets of the cor-
poration. 
In the midst of the hearing and taking testimony 
herein, Beckstead, on Sunday, September 29, 1940, deliv-
ered and disposed of 1102 lambs for which he received a 
draft for $4300.00, having theretofore, received as a cash 
down payment on the sales an additional $1,000.00. 
Plaintiffs, learning of this sale, applied to the court 
for an order to restrain Beckstead from cashing or using 
the $4300.00 and to preserve its status quo) pending deter-
mination of this cause on its merits (Tr. 1142-1152). 
Evidence 'vas introduced to the effect that in addition 
to the $4300.00 check, the Beckstead Livestock Company 
then had cash on hands of about $2800.00; that the current 
indebtedness consisted of $1600.00, representing wages for 
one year back for one employee, $600.00 owing to the fore-
man, ~Ir. Youngberg, and back salary due Beckstead. 
The court inquired respecting the taxes on the Wyom-
ing property and was informed that same would not be-
come due until l\iay (Tr. 1152). 
No testimony whatever was given before the trial 
court of any delinquent taxes owing, and throughout the 
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entire proceedings defendants have at all times, when in 
court, represented that each of their corporations is on a 
thoroughly sound financial basis and solvent. 
Under these circumstances, how was the trial court 
to know that the livestock company was broke; that its 
taxes were delinquent and that were the check impounded 
the livestock company would suffer loss for "charges for 
penalty and interest on delinquent taxes", as is charged 
by appellants at page 225 of their brief? 
These confessions, indicating the weak financial con-
dition of the two corporations, cause respondents to be 
most apprehensive as to what an accounting of the affairs 
of the two companies will reveal on the solvency question. 
The trial court was not motivated by prejudice against 
defendants in permitting plaintiffs to amend their com-
plaint, nor in denying defendants' motion to dismiss at 
the conclusion of plain tiffs' case (A pp. Br. 9, 204) . 
The court's rulings on the admission of evidence herein 
likewise were not motivated by prejudice, but they were 
the result of the sound application of the rules of evidence. 
Judge Schiller is to be complimented on his conduct 
throughout this case and on the record which he has made 
for this court to review. 
At page 233 of their brief appellants complain of the 
"great haste" in which the trial court tried this case. The 
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record is quite to the contrary for the trial of this case 
consumed a great deal of time and a vast amount of evi-
dence ''as introduced. 
This cause "?as fully and exhaustively covered in oral 
arguments by counsel for all parties. The trial court 
patiently heard the arguments, giYing each side all of the 
time that "?as either requested or required . 
. A.mple time 'Yas gil"en for the preparation of briefs 
and exhaustil"e briefs were filed by respective counsel. 
In fact the trial court granted the parties s:o much 
time and he so carefully considered the facts and the law 
applicable thereto, that but four minutes remained of his 
term of office when, on January 6, 1941, he signed and filed 
the findings of fact, decree and order appointing the re-
ceiver herein ( .A.pp. Br. 7). 
4. REFUSAL TO VACATE ORDER APPOINTING 
RECEIVER 
Assignment No. 4 
That this is a proper case for the appointment of a 
receiver 'Yill be shown by the authorities and cases here-
inafter cited under the portion of this brief designated by 
the topic heading "The Law,'. 
As is aptly said in Kennedy Drug Co. v. Keyes, 60 
'Va~h. 337, 111 Pac. 175 at p. 177: 
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"A statement of the facts disclosed by the evi-
dence is sufficient to sustain the order appointing 
the receiver." 
See also: 
Mangold v. Adrian Irrigation Company, 60 
Wash. 286, Ill Pac. 173. 
It was not, therefore, error for the trial court to refuse 
to vacate its order appointing the receiver herein (Assign-
ment No. 4, App. Br. 10, 235). 
5. DENIAL OF MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL 
Assignment No. 5 
No compelling grounds or reasons were shown to Dis-
trict Judge Evans that would warrant him in undoing all 
the work and labors of Judge Schiller before whom the 
case was heard, and the order of Judge Evans denying de-
fendants' motion to a new trial is correct (Assignment 
No. 5, A pp. Br. 10, 235). (See decision of Judge Evans in 
Appendix to this brief.) 
THE LAW 
Corporation May Not Buy Its Own Stock 
1. In Utah a corporation is prohibited by law from 
buying its own stock. 
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Constitution of Utah, Art. XII, Sec. 5 
Re,ised Statutes Utah (1933) 18-2-17 
Revised Statutes Utah (1933) 18-2-18 
ReYised Statutes Utah ( 1933) 33-1-5 
Revised Statutes Utah (1933) 103-12-4 
Pace v. Pace Bros. Co., 91 Utah 132, 59 P. (2d) 
1, also 91 l"Ttah 149. 
Sec. 5, .A .. rt. XII, Constitution of Utah, provides: 
"Corporations shall not issue stock, except to 
bona fide subscribers thereof orr their assignee, nor 
shall any corporation issue any bond, or other obli-
gation, for the payment of money, except for money 
or property received, or labor done. The stock of 
corporations shall not be increased, except in pur-
suance of general law, nor shall any law authorize 
the increase of stock without the consent of the per-
son or persons holding the larger amount in va1ue 
of the stock, or without due notice of the proposed 
increase having previously been given in such man-
ner as may be prescribed by law. All fictitious in-
crease of stock or indebtedness shall be void/' ( Ital-
ics ours) 
Sec. 18-2-17, R. S. Utah provides;: 
"No corporation shall make or pay any divi-
dend except from the surplus profits arising from 
the business of the corporation and in the cases and 
manner allowed by law; nor divide, withdraw, or 
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in any manner except as provided by law pay to the 
stockholders or any of them_, any part of the capital 
of the corporation/) (Italics ours) 
Sec. 18-2-18, R. S. Utah provides: 
"No corporation shall receive or discount any 
note or other evidence of debt with the intent to 
enable any stockholder to withdraw any part of the 
money paid in by him on his stock, except as pro-
vided by law." 
Sec. 33-1-5, R. S. Utah provides: 
"Every conveyance made without fair consider-
ation, when the person making it is engaged, or is 
about to engage, in a business or transaction for 
which the property remaining in his hands after the 
conveyance is an unreasonably small capital, is 
fraudulent as to creditors, and as to other persons 
who become creditors during the continuance of 
such business or transaction, without regard to his 
actual intent.'' 
Sec. 103-12-4, R. S. Utah provides: 
"Every director of any stock corporation who 
concurs in any vote or act of the directors of such 
corporation or any of them, by which it is intended 
either: 
( 1) To make any dividend except from the 
surplus profits arising from the business of the cor-
poration) and in the cases and manner allowed by 
law; or, 
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(2) To diYide, "·ithdraw or in any manner, 
except as proYided by la,Y, pay to the stockholders, 
or any of the1n, any part of the capital of the cor-
poration; or, 
(3) To discount or receive any note or other 
e"lidence of debt in payment of any installment ac-
tually called in and required to be paid, or with the 
intent to provide the means of making such pay-
ment; or, 
( J) To receire or discount any note or other 
evidence of debt, 'Yith the intent to enable any stock-
holder to 'Yithdravf any part of the money paid in 
by him on his stock ; or, 
( 5) To receive from any other stock corpora-
tion in exchange for the shares) notes) bonds or other 
evidences of debt of their own corrporation shares of 
the capital stock of such other corporations) or notes, 
bonds or other evidences of debt issued by such cor-
poration ;-is guilty of a misdemeanor." (Italics 
ours) 
In the carefully considered and well reasoned case of 
Pace v. Pace Bros. Co., 91 Utah 132, this court, speaking 
through )lr. Justice Wolfe (pp. 137, 138, 146-148) said: 
""re see no reason why the prohibition against 
'paying' to a stockholder a part of the capital does 
not include buying his stock. * * * Furthermore, 
the payment of capital for a certificate of stock is 
nothing more or less than a withdrawal. When a 
person withdra,Ys, he surrenders his stock certifi-
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cate and pulls out his pro rata or other portion of 
the property. 103-12-4, subd. 2, impliedly prohibits 
a withdrawal of capital. To pay capital for a sur-
render of a stockholder's rights in the corporation 
-w·orks a withdrawal of capital. * * * Certainly, 
the ordinary connotation of payment of capital 
would include payment for stock or a purchase of 
the stock. * * * 
It is difficult to see how a corporation could 
btty its own stock without paying to the stockholder 
a part of its assets. That is impliedly prohibited 
by special language. There are many ways in ·which 
corporations may buy personal property without 
buying their own stock. Consequently, the implied 
prohibition against the prurchase of its stock is 
simply one exception to the general authority to 
buy personal property. This sort of articulation 
makes sense. * * * 
"Moreover, we can see no reasonable way to 
escape from the wording and intent of 103-12-4, 
subd. 2. It was meant to prevent assets from being 
used to liquidate the stock of the stockholders. 
Future as well as present creditors should be able 
to rely on the implied representation that the cor-
poration holds assets as represented by its out-
standing stock. * * * Moravetz on Private Corpo-
rations, Sec. 112, states: 
. (( (A purchase by a corporation of shares of it.~ 
own stock in effect amounts to a withdrawal of the 
shareholder whose shares are purchased, fro1n mem-
bership in the company) and a repayn1 ent of his 
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proportt~onate share of the co1npaHy's assets. There 
is no substitution of me1nbership under these cir-
cumstances, as in case of a purchase and transfer 
of shares to a third person, but the members of the 
company and the amount of its capital are actually 
diminished. ''"'"batever a transaction of this char-
acter may be called in legal phraseology, it is clear 
that it really involves an alteration of the company's 
constitution, just as the 'Yithdrawal of a member 
of a copartnership, "'"ith his proportionate share of 
the joint funds, involves an alteration of the con-
stitution of copartnership. The amount of the con~­
}Ja ny's a-ssets and the 11umber of it8 shareholders 
are dintinished_; erery continuing shareholder is in-
jnred by the rednction of the fund contributed for 
the coHnnon renture)· and the creditors who have 
trusted the company upon the security of the capital 
originally subscribed, or ",.ho are entitled to expect 
that amount of security, are entitled to complain. 
* * * The fact that such a transaction may not 
necessarily be injurious to any person is not a suffi-
cient reason for supporting it. It is contrary to 
the fundamental agreement of the shareholders, 
and is condemned by the plainest dictates of sound 
policy. To allow the directors to exercise such a 
potcer tcould be a fruitful source of unfairness, n~is­
nzanaye1nents, and corruption. It is for these reas-
ons that a shareholder cannot be allowed to 1vith-
dra1o fronl the corporation "'"ith his proportionate 
amount of capital, either by a release and cancela-
tion before the shares have been paid up, or by a 
purrhase of the shares with the com,pany's funds.' 
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* * -K· 
"Every state which has come to our attention 
as having such a statute as 103-12-4, except Mon-
tana, has interpreted this section to prohibit a cor-
poration from buying its own stock. * * * 
"The statute specifically by implication pro-
hibits payment of capital to a stockholder. * * * 
The courts must not make exceptions and cannot 
construe directly against the prohibition. * * * 
"We believe that 103-12-4, subd. 2, was desig-
nated to prevent the purchas:e by a corporation of 
its own stock even though at the time of the pur-
chase it was not insolvent nor would be by such 
purchases rendered insolvent, at least in cases where 
it was not for the protection of the corporation or 
for its legitimate corporate purposes. If there are 
any exceptions to this statement they are not pre-
sented by this case and we need not consider them. 
The purchase by the defendant company of its own 
stock from Sidney Pace was null and void/) (Italics 
ours) 
In Pace v. Pace Bros., 91 Utah 149, 63 P. (2d) 590, 
being on rehearing in the case above cited (91 Utah 132), 
this court, at p. 151 said: 
"Most property has a fairly wide margin for 
difference of opinion in value. It would be quite 
easy for a corporation to value its as.sets high and 
thus create a surplus and pay it out for one man's 
stock. When the creditors attempted to collect, 
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they might haYP the onus of proving that many 
piecPs of property \rere oyerYnl ned so as show' there 
"~as no surplus. If the actual property represented 
by paid-in capital should, on a boom market, rise 
aboT"e that measured by the corporation's stock lia-
bilit~~, under such interpretation 'surplus' might be 
used to buy the corporation's stock. When the 
market receded, the 'capital' would be depleted and 
the treasur~~ would haT"e in its place a batch of stock 
certificates. This "rould be rather hazardous for 
creditors. 1l' e think it was the intention of the 
Legislature to prohibit a corporation from paying 
out to stockholders any of its assets emcept profits 
·in the fornz of di·cidends) or under such special cir-
cumstances as indicated in the opinion to be .an ex-
ception. The word 'capital' is to be read as 'assets.' 
1\~atura.lly a di'Cidend cannot be paid to one stock-
holder in consideration for the surrender of his 
stock) hence plaintiff's argument that $8,536 of the 
$60,000 was a dividend to Sidney D. Pace must fall." 
(Italics ours) 
MISMANAGEMENT 
In Tardy's Smith on Receivers (1920 Ed.) Volume 1, 
page 723, it is said : 
"The circumstances most commonly relied 
upon by minority stockholders as a basis for an 
application for a receiver is mismanagament of the 
corpora,te affairs. * * * 
"'Vhen all has been said that may be said along 
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this line it still remains a fact, according to nnnler-
ous decisions of many courts, that mismanagement 
of corporate affairs by the majority may ju~tify a 
demand on the part of a minority that an officer of 
the court be placed in control. A majority of the 
stockholders of a corporation_, no ntatter how large} 
has no right to divert to themselves assets of the 
company to the detriment of its creditors and stock-
holders. . . . Although the majority of the stock 
of a company may vote and vote as self-interest dic-
tates and un<J_er ordinary circumstances the relation 
of trustee and cestui que trust does not exist and 
the ordinary rules in respect to trusts are not to be 
applied, yet such power is not unlimited. 
"The law requires of the majority the utmost 
good faith in the control and management of the 
corporation as to the minority. It is the essence of 
this trust that it shall be so managed as to prod·uce 
for each stockholder the best possible return for his 
investment.-'-' (Italics ours) 
In Clark on The Law of Receivers, Volume 1, page 265, 
Sec. 233 (c), it is said: 
"Courts of equity do, independent of statute, 
appoint receivers of corporations when a proper 
suit is pending for final relief. Such courts do so 
when gross mismanagement_, positive misconduct} or 
other grounds show a breach of trust on the part of 
the officers of the corporation." (Italics ours) 
!D 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-99-
In High on R.eeei Yers, ( J t h Ed.) Sec. 295 (b), page 
356, 35 7, it is said : 
""1Yhere, ho,vever, it appears that the officers 
and a majority of the stockholders of a corporation 
are grossly nz is1nanaging its affairs in their own 
interests and are fraudulently and wrongfully mis-
appropriating the corporate property for their indi-
"lidual profit. a proper case is presented for the ap-
pointment of a receiver at the instance of the minor-
ity stockholders." (Citing Ponca ill ill Company v. 
Jlikesell, 55 :Xeb. 98, 75 N. \V. 46; Hampton v. 
Buchanan, 51 \Vash. 155, 98 Pac. 374. Italics ours) 
Again, High on Receivers, at p. 356 : 
"And the relief may be granted where the bill 
discloses a scheme upon the part of the majority of 
the directors to tvreck the corporate property in the 
interest of a wrongful combination of a majority of 
the stockholders with a majority of the board of 
directors." (Citing Oantwall v. Columbia Lead 
Company) 198 Mo. 1, 95 S. W. 856; State v. District) 
15 3lont. 324, 39 Pac. 316; Hall v. Nieukirk, 12 
Idaho 33, 85 Pac. 485. Italics ours) 
In Fletcher on Corporations, Volume 16, page 163, 
166, it is said : 
"For instance, misconduct of corp~orate officers 
or majority stockholders is a ground where evident 
that they are trying to wreck the corporation for 
their own benefit, or where they are trying to freeze 
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out the ntinority, or "There the misntanagement is 
evidenced by or accompanied with conversion, mis-
appropriation or diversion of corporate funds by 
such officers or stockholders provided the misap-
propriation or diversion is substantial." (Italics 
ours.) 
In Ponca Mill Company v. Mikesell, 55 Neb. 98, 75 
N. W. 46, at page 48, the court said: 
"Matters of corporate policy must be deter-
mined by the corporation itself. On the other hand, 
when it already appears that the dispute is not of 
that character, but arises out of an attempt of the 
officers or the majority stockholders to abuse their 
power by misappropriating the corporate property, 
by using the corporate means for their individ1tal 
profit, or by so a·cting as to wilfu.lly and wrongfully 
jeopardize the corporate business, then the courts 
should not hesitate to afford relief. No one is more 
helpless, unless aided by the arm of the law, than 
the holder of a small portion of the stock of a cor-
poration, when the large stockholders combine to 
advance their private interests at the expense of 
the corporation. Here the demurrer admits, for 
the purpose of this proceeding, the grossest 
breaches of trust and dishonesty on the part of the 
officer, and that a single man_, one of the wrong 
doers, holds sttch a proportion of the stock that 
others are helpless, and cannot obtain relief through 
other channels." (Italics ours.) 
~I 
~II, 
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llrent Y. B. E. Brister sn,vnlill Co., 103 ~liss. 876, 
60 So. 101~, is an exceptionally "·t~ll-reasoned case \Vhich 
revie,vs the modern eases and announces the modern rule 
applicable "~here nl isn1a nage1ncnt is relied upon as grounds 
for a receivership. There the court, at pp. 1020-1022, said: 
'·\~Te kno"'" that in the past the courts have laid 
do,vn as a general rule that a court of equity, in 
the absence of statutory authority, is W'ithout juris-
diction at a suit of a stockholder to wind up the 
affairs of a solvent going corporation, or to appoint 
a receiver "'"i th that end in vie": ; and we understand 
that this rule has been based upon the reason that 
a corporation is the creature of the state and its life 
depends upon the action of the state, or of the stock-
holders as a "'"hole. We find that in the progress 
of time and in the development of the jurisprudence 
of our land this rule has been somewhat changed, 
and the pozcer of a court of equity has been enlarged 
for the purpose of more fully protecting the inter-
ests of all those owning interests in corporations. 
In truth, at the present time a large part of the 
business of the world is being conducted through 
corporations. It has been necessary to change ma-
terially the general rules originally applied by the 
eonrts in construing the obligations and duties of 
those engaged in b us,iness through corporatio~r;;. 
The tendency of the tin1es is to treat corporations 
as if th e.iJ 'loere trading co-partnerships) ~r:ith the 
.~tockholders as nternbers of the concern. It was 
stated by Chancellor \Valworth that: 'Joint-stock 
corporations are mere partnerships, except in form; 
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the directors are the trustees or managing partners, 
and the stockholders are the cestuis que trust, and 
have a joint interest in all the property and effects 
of the corporation.' In the case of Fougeray v. 
Cord, 50 N. J. Eq. 185, 24 Atl. 499, Hinman, C. J., 
said : 'Joint-stock companies in modern times are 
nothing but commercial partnerships which have 
taken the form of corporations for the greater facil-
ity of transacting busines'S.' 
art is certainly the duty of the officers and di-
rectors of a co1npany to conduct its affairs so as to 
carry out the purposes of its organization to succeed 
in the business enterprise in hand, to preserve its 
property, and to recognize and protect the rights 
and claims of all parties in interest. If they fail 
in doing this)" it is then their d~tty to bring the affairs 
of the company to a conclusion. The 1najority of 
the directors and stockholders should see that this 
is done. Now, if in the face of the failure of the 
management to do its duty, and of the failure of 
the purposes of organization, and of apparent loss 
to the company and ultimate insolvency, the ma-
jority refuses to wind up the affairs of the company, 
then should not the rights of the minority stock-
holders be protected by the law? And if so, is not 
equity the proper court to extend such protection? 
We fully understand that everything possible should 
be done by the rninority to get a recognition of their 
rights and preservation of their interests tDithin 
the corporation)· but) when it has been shown that 
this has been done) then it should not be said they 
are without any means of relief) and that they are 
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required ·in the adnlinistration of the latD) to stand 
idly by a.nd see the property in which they arc inter-
ested u~asted and lost and the business enterprise 
n~rccked. 
'·It has been decided that: 'If it plainly ap-
pears that the object for 'Yhich the company was 
formed is impossible, it becomes the duty of the 
company·s agents to put an end to its operations 
and "yind up its affairs; and, should they, though 
supported by a majority of the stockholders, pursue 
operations which must eventually be ruinous, orr 
should the enterprise be abandoned as impossible 
of reaii.:·ation. any shareholder would) upon plain 
eq zl'itab le principles. be entitled to the assistance 
of a court of equity) and decree should be rendered 
compelling the directors to wind up the company's 
business and distribute its assets among those en-
titled to them.' Ulmer v. Maine Real Estate Co., 
93 ){e. 32-!, 45 Atl. 40; Benedict v. Columbus Con-
struction Co., 49 N. J. Eq~ 23, 23 Atl. 485. * * -x-
"It is settled in this state, where there is an 
absence of a statute on the subject, that a cou.rt of 
equity) at the instance of a creditor, has the j~tris­
diction to appoint a receiver beoause of fraud,ulent 
1nirnnanagement of the directors of a corporation. 
Benjamin v. Staples, 93 ~fiss. 507, 4 7 South 425. 
\f e see no sufficient reason why it should not also 
be settled that a co~trt of equity in this state, when 
it sll rtll apzJear that by gross mismanagement of the 
a flairs and rnisapplication of the property or funds 
of a corporation by the directors, or other officers 
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in control) the rights of the stockholders) as well as 
the creditors, are being put in jeopardy) or when it 
shall be necessary to protect the interests of such 
stockholders or creditors and preserve the assets 
of the business injuriously affected by such mis-
management or of fraud in the management, rnay 
appoint a receiver to take charge of the business of 
the corporation) and in proper cases, under the 
orders of the court and in the progress of the re-
ceivership, wind up such business. Therefore, in 
the present case we decide that the chancery court 
has the jurisdiction to appoint a receiver at the in-
stance of the minority stockholders) to take charge 
of the b1tsiness of the corporation) and if it is shown 
to the court to be necessary, to wind up such busi-
ness." (Italics ours.) 
In Hechler v. Emery et al, 226 N. Y. S. 599, 131 Mis. 
Rep. 393, the court said : 
"vVhatever view may be taken as to the pro-
priety, the reasonableness and the interpretation 
of the contracts by which defendant, Emery, ob-
tained a 10lf0 commission on all shares of Class B 
non-voting stock of the corporation, which sales 
approximate $2,000,000.00, that phase 1vhich relates 
to Class A_ voting stork is of a highly questio1wble 
character. Here we have a contract entered into 
by the corporation when it was practically in its 
embryo state, whereby Emery was granted the 
power to sell its non-voting stock on co1nmission 
and the sole right to purchase 5,000 shares: of its 
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Yoting ~tock 'Yith n fiye year option to take up the 
15,000 reinaining share8 of such stock at $10.00 a 
share. This stork "·as to be purrhased out of the 
commission to be earned by him. The 5)000 shares 
hat·e th-us been acquired by hint 1citlz the result that 
he i~ ·in a bsol·u te control of the corporation) ~vith 
full power of disposition orer its assets and of this 
he took unto h inz.self zr·ithout the invest1nent of any 
nloney whaterer) except such as he recei.ved by 
reason of lz is coH nections zcith the corporation. The 
situati-on presented here is an e.rtreme case of abuse 
·in corporati.on organi.~·ation) the subject of much 
current co1nment by econo1nists) whereby a small 
group of rating stockholders are generally given 
control orer the destinies of a corporate entity) most 
of whose stock is of non-voting character. A sweep-
ing but just criticism of such an undemocratic 
method of corporate organization is contained in 
Professor Ripley's book, '~1ain Street and Wall 
Street.' In the chapter significantly entitled 'A 
Birthright for Pottage' at page 68, he thus arraigns 
promoters in a recent organization, who assumed 
sole control of a corporation by retaining all the 
voting stock: 'The promoters have virtually paid 
themselves a handsome profit for the assumption of 
the entire directorial po"rer, having mortgaged the 
property to the full amount of its cost through out-
standing bonds and preferred stock, including both 
assets and capitalized earning power and the amaz-
ing thing is that this final death blo'Y to the exercise 
of yoting rights by the general public has brought 
no voice of protest. Yet the plan bears every a p-
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pearance of a bald and outrageous theft of the last 
tittle of responsibility for management of the actual 
owners by those who were setting up these latest 
financial erections. Isn't it the prettiest case ever 
known of having a cake and eating it too?' Here 
the circumstances disclose a rnore flagrant situa-
tion, because the entire voting control is centered 
in the hands of one man. Unless his absolute and 
unlimited power be restrained pending the deter-
mination of the action, it may well be, as it is 
argued, that he will distribute the stock among dtttrn-
mies of his own choosing, w·hile actually remaining 
in sole control. 
"The motion for the appointment of a receiver 
is therefore granted. Submit order." (ItalicS' ours·.) 
In Kennedy Drug Co. et al v. Keyes, (Wash.) 1.11 Pac. 
175 at pp. 176 and 177, the court said: 
"From this statement it will be seen that the 
appellant Keyes has obtained complete control of 
the corporation, holding nearly two-thirds of its 
capital stock for which he paid nothing. It is fur-
ther shown that he caused a subservient board of 
trustees to elect him president, to make him general 
manager for a term of five years· without power of 
revocation, at a salary of $2,500. He insists that 
he paid value for his stock, but he fails to prod1tce 
any satisfactory evidence of that claim. 
* * * * * 
"Other irregular acts have been shown, but we 
think a sufficient statement has been made to dis-
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close the manipulation, attitude, and eonduct of 
appellants. Keyes, as a pron1oter of the new cor-
poration, has obtained for himself, 'vithout con-
sideration, large profits in the form of stock held 
by him 'Yhich he Yotes and which places him in 
absolute control of the corporation. He has reaped 
such profits by the use of property of respondent, 
to its disadvantag·e and prejudice, and by the vio-
lation of his promise to sell, for the benefit of the 
new corporation and its business, the identical stock 
"Thich he now holds and claims to own. He did not 
sell to the corporation, at a fair valuation, any prop-
erty which he owned or to which he held title. On 
the contrary, he used respondent's property not 
only to procure the money and stock which respond-
ent received, b nt also to obtain for himself a much 
greater amount of stock to which he now asserts 
oH·nership. He has thus secured for hirnself heavJJ 
profits not disclosed to respondent_, which he was not 
entitled to obtain tvithout its consent) and tvhich ht 
no-w holds and uses to its prejudice. 
"Appellants insist that respondent knowingly 
consented and agreed to accept the stock considera-
tion ""hich it has received from the appellant corpo-
ration, and that respondent did not contract for or 
require any sale of the stock now held by Keyes.-
Xo better response can be made to this contention 
than to quote the statement of the trial judge, who 
said: 'When Kennedy (respondent's agent) turned 
this property over to Keyes to go into this corpora-
tion, it is inconceivable that it was in the mind of 
Kennedy, at least, at that time, that a corporation 
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for $100,000 should be formed, and that he should 
have 176 shares for his $17,600 worth of property, 
and that Keyes would have 611 shares for no assets 
whatever. Keyes now has the absolute control of 
this corporation. While the capital stock is a thous-
and shares, he owns 611. There are 75 shares in the 
treasury. There are 15 shares which have been re-
tired according to their theory of it, which would 
reduce it to 915 shares, or 925 s:hares, it makes no 
difference. That being true, Keyes now owns 611 
shares, or two-thirds, over two-thirds, of the voting 
capital stock of that concern. The board of trustees 
is absolutely under ·his domination. He can call a 
meeting of the stockholders and discharge every 
member of the board of trustees under the statute, 
by two-thirds vote. Kennedy's property has now 
come under the absolute domination of Keyes. He 
has the power to bond this. property for $20,000, put 
it out of existence, and deprive Kennedy of any-
thing more than he might get pro rata on his stock 
as it now stands. I do not believe that the la"r ever 
in tended in dealing with corporations that one man 
should get the control of another man's property in 
the method in which this was obtained and retain 
dominion over it.' 
"In l\1angold v. Adrian Irrigation Company, 
(recently decided by this court) 111 Pac. 173, we 
held that promoters of a corporation who in a sense 
are trustees: for, and owe an obligation of good fa it h 
to, investing stockholders, and who then1selves haYe 
no substantial investment in the enterprise, cannot 
be permitted to obtain profits to themselves with-
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out the knO\Yledgt:'l or con~Pnt of inYesting s.tock-
holdei·s 'vho haYe furnished thP only financial sup-
port or assets 'vhich the promoted corporation pos-
sesses. ~! statcn1ent of the facts disclosed by the CV'i-
dence is sufficient to susta-in the order appoint~ing 
the recei-rer. Respondents demanded an account-
ing~ and a surrender of the stock held by the appel-
lant Keyes, both of '""hich were refused by Keyes 
and the appellant corporation. R,espondents claim 
that Keyes is "·ithout financial responsibility. The 
endence fails to show that he has any property, 
other than the stock in dispute in this action which 
he no\Y claims. His management threatens the cor-
poration '""ith insolvency. The trial court so found, 
and the eT"idence is sufficient to support that find-
ing. .A.ppellants contend that a receiver should not 
be appointed for the corporation, because it is a 
going concern and is solvent. Its solvency is denied. 
But conceding it to be a going concern, evidence has 
been introduced to show that the appellant Keyes 
has obtained complete control by means of 611 
shares of stock, which he has caused to be issued to 
himself "'"ithout payment or consideration; and 
that, being thus in control, he is so conducting the 
business as to threaten insolvency. If there was 
any substantial evidence that he had paid value for 
and o"·ned the stock no"T held by him, in what he 
claims is a going and solvent corporation, a different 
question would be presented; but no such showing 
has been made.'' (Italics ours.) 
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In Cant'\Yell et al v. Colu1nbia Lead Co., 97 S. VV. 167 
at p. 179, the Supreme Court of l\1issouri said: 
"Courts have hesitated to lift the affairs and 
assets out of the hands of its board of directors and 
administer them through receivers, and have flatly 
said so, and given cogent reasons for this hesitancy:" 
(Citing cases.) "But when all this has been said, 
it may further be said that this court has. never 
denied power in a chancellor to prevent a scheme of 
irreparable injury and wrong merely because the 
movers in that scheme speak and act in a corporate 
capacity rather than in an individual capacity. 
That solvent corporations are wrecked for purely 
selfish and illegal purposes, that minority interests 
are (frozen out/ that business immorality has run 
amuck under the assumption that courts are power-
less, is too true. But the assumption is tDrong. 
Judicial hesitancy does not mean judicial atrophy 
or paralysis. The board of dit·ectors of a corpora-
tion are but trustees of an estate for all the stock-
holders, and may not only be amenable to the law, 
personally, for a breach of trust, but their corporate 
power under color of office to effectua·te a conte1n-
. plated wrong may be taken from them when, by 
fraud, conspiracy, or covinous condttct, or emtrerne 
misn~anagement, the rights of minority stockholders 
are put in imminent peril, and the underlying) ori,q-
. inal, corporate entente cordiale is 'ltnfairly de-
stroyed. It would be a sad commentary on the law 
· if, when the trustee of a corporate estate is nuliking 
. an improper disposition of it, or has shown i1npr·oper 
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· pa·rtiality to1ca rds one of its coHfrict·ing part·ics) 
or has put the estate in a fi.r ·it Is liable and likely 
to be either 'u~astcd or destroyed., or 1nercilessly taken 
fronl. all and giren to a part, a court could not reach 
out its ar1n, and preserPe and adnlinister the estate. 
-n:e haYe never so declared the la,v. Greely v. Bank, 
103 Jlo. ~12, 15 S. ''r· -!29; Rev. St. 1699, Sec. 753; 
Id. Sec. 1338, 1339; Gluck & Becker on Receivers 
of Corporations, Sec. 9, p. 53; Smith on Receiver-
ships, Sec. ~~3; .AJlison on Receivers, Sec. 346-357; 
and see, generally, the cases cited in State ex rei. 
.. Attorney General Y. People,s United States Bank, 
supra. 
'"The bill in this case stateS' a cause of action, 
and the court had jurisdiction to appoint a receiver, 
in our opinion. Therefore, the judgment and order 
nisi, refusing to revoke the appointment of one is, 
accordingly, affirmed. All concur." (Citing numer-
ous authorities; italics ours.) 
In )lorse v. Metropolitan S. S. Co. et al, 87 N. J. E.q. 
219, 100 Atl. 219 at p. 221, the court said : 
"I do not find all the circumstances under 
which the court may intervene have ever been defi-
nitely determined. In the nature of things they 
could not be. I do not find that the courts of this 
state have in any wise limited the ·general doctrine 
which prevails in England and throughout this 
country that, tchererer because of gross abuse .of 
trust, because of dissensions among the members of 
the board of directors or the stockholders, because 
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there is no properly constituted board, or because 
the company has failed of its purpose, there is a 
necessity for judicial intervention, a court of equity 
rnay intervene under its general jtttrisdiction and 
appoint a receiver and grant such other relief as 
may be necessary. The text-book authorities are to 
the effect that the power exists, but, of course, must 
be exercised with discretion. Thompson on Cor-
porations, vol. 5, sec. 6826; Beach on Receivers, Sec. 
424; Machen on Corporations, vol. 2, Sec. 1161; 
Clark & Marshall on Corporations, sec. 556; High 
on Receivers (4th ed.) sec. 288." (Italics ours.) 
Again in the Morse case, supra, at p. 222: 
"If this company was an operating concern, 
whose business might be hurt by the appointment 
of a receiver, there would be, of course, a further 
argument against any hasty action by this court. 
It is not. Its only function at the present time is 
to receive the rents from the Harvard and Yale, 
which are under a five-year lease on the Pacific 
Coast, and pay such debts as may incidentally ac-
crue. There is no discretion to be exercised. The 
directors have effectively foreclosed themselves from 
exercising any discretion. vVha tever the directors 
of this company might do can as well be done by a 
receiver.'' 
In Sant v. Perronville Shingle Co., 179 Mich. 42, 146 
N. W. 212 at pp. 217, 218;the court said: 
"That a minority stockholder may file a bill 
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to force an accounting nnd 'Yind up the affairs of 
the corporation '""here the officers in control refuse 
or neglect so to do, is 'Yell settled in this state. Miner 
v. Ice Co., 93 )Iieh. 97, 33 N. '''"· 218, 17 L. R. A. 
4:12. In the instant case the directors in control 
are the parties charged 'Yi t h the ,yrongdoing; and, 
under these facts, it 'yas unnecessary for the minor-
ity stockholder to make an effort to induce the di-
rectors in control to act. Robinson v. De Luxe 
)Iotor Car Co .. 170 )Iich. 163, 135 N. W. 897. * * * 
" ( 8, 9) It is urged that no individual inter-
ested in the corporation other than the complainants 
received any benefits from the result of the litiga-
tion. The corporation) however, is a legal entity) 
sepa.rrate and distinct from its individual stockhold-
ers) and) as the trial judge properly said) the ques-
tion is not) c~Vhat is the advantage or disadvantage 
restttlting to any stockholder or stockholders frorn 
the la-ze suit) but to the corporation itself/ The cor-
porate assets belong to the corporation for the pur-
poses of the corporation) and no stockholder has any 
right thereto until all the just claims against the 
corporation are paid." ( Italics ours. ) 
As 'vas said by the Federal Circuit Court in Columbia 
Nat. Sand Dredging Co. v. '\Tashed Bar Sand Dredging 
Co. et al, 136 Fed. 710 at p. 711: 
"There was no management on the part of the 
board of directors, but its affairs were managed as 
though they 1oere owned personally by Robert Pat-
tersen. * * 
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"It is not alleged that the defendant company 
is insolvent, but, upon the other hand, it is claimed 
that a payment to it of the amount actually due by 
the Pattersons and the Philadelphia Transportation 
& Lighterage Company, together with the amount 
which should have been paid in as capital of the 
concern, would not only make the stock valuable, 
but show a surplus belonging to the defendant com-
pany. * * * 
"The bill does not allege that the plaintiff has 
made a demand on the corporation or its officers to 
collect the amount alleged to be due it from the 
Philadelphia Transportation & Lighterage Com-
pany, nor for the collection of the amount due upon 
the capital stock, nor has it made any other demands 
upon the corporation, or any of its officers, to cor-
rect the mismanagement of the defendant company, 
nor do we think that it was necessary for it to do 
so in this case, as required by rule 94, as it is evident 
that where the officers of the corporation are man-
aging the concern entirely for their own profit) and 
the benefits derived from the corporation find their 
way) either directly through con tracts "~i th other 
concerns of which they are the owners, into the 
pockets of the officers) it is not necessary that the 
plaintiff should make demand upon them before 
filing its bill, as it manifest that such a demand 
"'ould be unavailing. Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U. 8. 
460, 26 L. Ed. 827; 'Veir v. Bay State Gas Co., (C. 
C.) 91 Fed. 940; Wolf v. Penna. Railroad Co., 193 
Pa. 91, 45 Atl. 936; Treat v. Ins. Co., 203 Pa. 21, 
52 Atl. 60. 
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'~(\Hlrt~ w·ill not take the property of a corpo-
ration out of the possession of its owners at the suit 
of a minorit~~ stockholder, 'vithout there is a very 
graYe necessity therefor; but 1rhcre the facts recited 
'lll a b-ill charging JnisJnanagentcnt shouJ that the 
board of directors trho arc responsible for the 1nis-
1nanagerncnt arc the ,nzajority stockholders,, and that 
they are managi·ng the corporation for their own 
benefit, and direrting its funds and income to thern-
selres) the 1ninority stockholders) or any of them, 
would be entitled to relief. either by inj~unction) 
"~here that remedy could correct the evil, or) if 
necessary) the appointnzent of a receiver) and the 
majority stockholders who violated their trust 
"~ould have no just cause of complaint." (Italics 
ours.) 
In Bankers' niortgage Co., v. Rupp, (C. C. A. 10) 66 
F. (2d) 992 at p. 994, it is said: 
"But a court of chancery may intervene and 
through the appointment of a receiver depose offi-
cers and directors when it appears that they are 
acting, or are about to act, in such manner as to 
constitute fraud or a breach of trust, resulting or 
reasonably calculated to result in injury to the 
corporation and its stockholders. This case falls 
squarely within that doctrine, universally recog-
nized throughout the country. * * * 
"Substantially all possible harm the appoint-
Inent of a receiver could do the busines:s of the cor-
poration-conceding its peculiarly sensitive char-
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acter-has been done. Continuation of the receiver-
ship, pending final determination of the case, could 
not add substantially to the peril. Moreover, it is 
apparent that the present officers, to whom man-
agement of the business would be restored if the 
receivership were stayed, do not .enjoy the whole-
hearted confidence of the bondholders, the public, 
or those charged with the administration of the Blue 
Sky Law in the state of Kansas ;" 
In Boothe v. Summit Coal l.Vlining Co., 55 "rash. 167, 
104 Pac. 207, at pp. 210, 211, it is said: 
"Although the appellant and R. ~J. Linden each 
own one-half of the capital stock, the latter is in 
exclusive possession. He arbitrarily conducts the 
corporation business, makes book entries, declares 
or refuses dividends, raises his own salary, retains 
his subservient trustees in office, and through them, 
perfor1ns s~tch corporate acts as he chooses. He and 
Boothe are not partners, yet their relative position 
created by their contract of sale is kindred to that 
of partners. Linden has thereby obtained absolute 
control of $25,000 in value of the appellant's estate, 
which he is arbitrarily handling wjthout consulting 
the appellant or granting him the least considera-
tion. Such a condition i-s an intolerable one for the 
a,ppellant and one that w~o~tl d not be pern~itted in u 
pwrtnershiz). 'Vere their positions changed, Linden 
would doubtless demand a receiver with as much 
energy as he now opposes one. If they were part-
:q.ers, a receiver would unquestionably be granted. 
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Xo rigl1ts of rreditor8, other stockholders, or third 
parties are here invol Yed. The only real parties in 
interest are Boothe and Robert J. Linden. As above 
stated, their position is kindred to that of partners. 
Present conditions trillu ndonbtedly co11tinne unless 
a court of eqtn~ty affords relief. Should they con-
tinue f 11:e think not. * * * 
··In the instant case there is no control of the 
corporation by a board of trustees, sustained by a 
majority of the stock, although originally the pres-
ent board may haT"e been legally elected. In prac-
t-ical operation there is no deliberati1;e board. R. J. 
Linden lzas as full) complete) and dicta·torial control 
as did Oudin in the case cited, and although the cor-
poration here involved in solvent, such a condition 
is inequitable and should not be permitted. It does 
ciolence to the elen~entary idea that a corporation 
is to be controlled by a governing board) represent-
ing a rnajority of the stock. No majority is in con-
trol nor can it obtain control/) (Italics ours.) 
See the following cases re mismanagement by the 
officers of corporations, viz : 
)liner v. Bell Isle Ice Co., 93 Mich. 97, 53 N. W. 
218• 
' Exchange Bank et al v. Bailey, 29 Okla. 246, 
116 Pac. 812; 
Columbia Nat. Sand Drudging Co. v. Washed 
Bar Sand Dredging Co. et al, 136 Fed. 710; 
State ex rel B. ~1. Consolidated C. M. Co. v. 
Second Judicial District, 22 Mont. 222, 
56 Pac. 219; 
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Hall v. Nieukirk, 12 Idaho 33, 85 Pac. 485 at 
page 489; 
Backus v. Finkalstein, 23 Fed. (2d) 357; 
Eldridge v. Payette-Boise Water Users Ass'n., 
285 Pac. 1039. 
INSOLVENCY NEED NOT BE SHOWN 
In High on Receivers, (4th Ed.) Sec. 295 (b) at page 
357, it is said: 
"And the relief has been granted although it 
appeared that the corporation was quite solvent." 
(Citing Jasper Land Company v. Wallis, 123 Ala. 
652, 26 So. 659.) 
Again, High on Receivers, p. 357 : 
"So where the board of directors are a majority 
of the stockholders and are grossly mismanaging 
the affairs of the corporation and are conducting 
the business for their own individual gain, the min-
ority stockholders are entitled to the appointment 
of a receiver although it appeared that the corpora-
tion was solvent." (Citing Columbia Nat. Sand 
Dredging Company v. Washed Bar Sand Dredging 
Company, 136 Fed. 710.) 
In re Consolidated Distributors, 298 Fed. 859, holds 
that insolvency of a corporation is not an essential pre-
requisite to the appointment of a receiver to conserve its 
assets. 
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In Lnhrig Colliers Co. v. Interstate Coal aiHl Dock 
Company, ~~1 Fed. (}3B, the court said that it \Yas 
"not necessary to allege that the corporation is 
presently insolYent or even that, "'"hen properly 
managed, it 'viii not haye a surplus for distribution 
among stockholders. * * * 
"The corporation may well be solvent if its 
assets be nursed along, and insolvent if they be 
thro"~n to the creditors for piece-meal sale." 
In Rugger v. )lt. Hood Electric Co., 143 Ore. 193, 
20 P. (2d) 4:12, the court said at p. 422: 
".A .. court of equity has jurisdiction to appoint 
a receiver for solvent corporations at the instance 
of stockholders, on the ground of fraud and mis-
management. 43 A. L. R. 246, and authorities there 
cited; Baillie v. Gold Min. Co., 86 Or. 1, 166 P. 
965, 167 p 0 1167." 
In Bo""'en v. Bowen-Romer Flour Mills Corp., 114 
Kan. 95, 217 Pac. 301, 43 A. L. R. 238, at pp. 241, 242, 
it is said: 
"The Legislature has authorized the appoint-
ment of a receiver in certain enumerated cases, and 
'in all other cases where receivers have heretofore 
been appointed by the usages of the courts of equity.' 
Gen. Stat. 1915, Sec. 7164 (Code Civ. Proc. Sec. 266) 
subd. 6. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-120-
"Courts of equity came into existence for the 
purpose of affording such relief as justice and good 
conscience required, under the peculiar circum-
stances of the case.- In some jurisdictions, instead 
of keeping up with social progress, equity has set 
and hardened. Its potency to meet new conditions 
has been emasculated, and frequently the caution 
to be displayed and the limitations to be observed 
in appointing receivers loom so large that as the 
Missouri court has observed, judicial hesitancy de-
generates into judicial atrophy. Cantwell v. Co-
lumbia Lead Co., 199 Mo. 1, 97 S. vV. 167. In other 
jurisdictions a better view is taken, and the phrase, 
'by the usages of courts of equity,' means according 
to the informing spirit of equity heretofore mani-
fested in the appointment of receivers. * * * 
"In Gibbs v. Morgan, 9 Idaho 100, 72 Pac. 733, 
the Supreme Court of Idaho well said: 
"'The early doctrine that the affairs of a cor-
poration could not be inquired into except by per-
mission of the Attorney General, and that courts 
of equity should not interfere with the po"rer and 
authority of the directors of a corporation because 
that "rould result in its dissolution, has been modi-
fied to meet existing conditions. A large part of the 
business of the world is done through corporations, 
and it was held in Columbian Athletic Club v. State, 
143 Ind. 98, 28 L. R. A. 727, 52 Am. St. Rep. 4:07, 
40 N. E. 914, that the courts of equity should adapt 
their practice as far as possible to the existing state 
of society, and apply its jurisdiction to all those ne"r 
cases which, from the progress daily making in the 
ln 
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affnirs of men, n1ust continually arise, and should 
not fron1 too striet an adherence to the forms and 
rules established under Yery different circumstances, 
decline to administer justice and to enforce rights 
for "Thich there is no other remedy.'" 
In the annotation to the above case, 43 A. L. R. at p. 
2±6, it is said: 
'~X otwithstanding the fact that there has oc-
casionally been some judicial expression of opinion 
to the contrary, the rule 'is now well settled that a 
court of equity has inherent jurisdiction) at the 
instance of the stockholders, in a proper case) to 
appoint a recei rer for a solt·en t corporation) on the 
ground of fraud, gross misrnanagement) or dissen-
sions among the stockholders, directors, or officers, 
if there is no other adequate remedy. (In general, 
the cases here cited are those of solvent going cor-
porations, or at least their support of the ·rule indi-
cated is not dependent on a contrary condition.)" 
(Citing numerous cases. Italics ours.) 
Stevens v. South Ogden Land, Bldg. & Imp. Co., 14 
Utah 232, J7 Pac. 81, is one of the cases "rhich is cited in 
43 A. L. R. 246-2-±8 in support of the above quoted annota-
tion. 
SYSTEMATIC AND HABITUAL EVIL PRACTICES 
It is true that in Fletcher on Corporations, Vol. 16, 
at p. 172, the author states that, 
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"before a court of equity will appoint a receiver of 
a corporation which is a going and prosperous con-
cern, and is neither insolvent nor in danger of in-
solvency, because it does things which are dishonest, 
the evil practices must be systematic and habitual 
and so interwoven as to become a part of the general 
business/) (Italics ours.) 
ACCOUNTING 
The stockholders, having put their money in the cor-
poration, and having supplied all its capital, are entitled 
to know how their money has been and is being used. 
Beckstead, as manager of the corporation, is only a 
trustee and he is required to account to the owners for the 
manner in which he has discharged his trust. 
The stockholders are entitled to know the true state 
of the finances and the true condition of the corporation. 
The sworn testimony of Beckstead respecting tb ese 
matters will not suffice. 
It is not the swearing but it is the creditable swearing 
which establishes facts in a lawsuit. 
The hearing which plaintiffs "\Yere given in the court 
below was neither an accounting nor a substitution for an 
accounting. It served only to place before the chancellor 
the facts showing the general need and necessity for an 
accounting. 
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In Bancroft's Code Praetice and Remedies, '""olume 
6 :--.. 43-·~ - 'l•"l •t . "d , ~ec. · • -. p. ~~ -· 1 . Is sa1 : 
""Courts of equity haYe al,vays asserted juris-
diction over an accounting \vhere fiduciary relations 
exist betvreen the parties, whether of partnership 
or in some other manner. ...\nd if an action involves 
a long and complicated account, the court has juris-
diction regardless of the legal relationship between 
the parties.~· 
In Cyclopedia of La",. and Procedure, Volume 1, p. 
436, it is said : 
"The bill must state the facts upon which com-
plainant is entitled to call upon defendants to 
render an account, and which make defendants 
liable to do so. But it is sufficient to show the re-
lation of the parties which entitled complainant to 
the relief, and the general statement of the matters 
pertaining to "T hich the account is sought will be 
sufficient. The items of the account need not be 
stated, and where the issues necessary involve a 
general accounting the evidence need not be con-
fined to the claims set up by either party." 
Again in Cyclopedia of Law and Procedure, Volume 
1, p. 439: 
"A general prayer for an accounting is suffi-
cient to call defendant to account in the character 
in which he is charged and for the matters embraced 
'vithin the relief made proper by the allegations of 
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the bill. And so, if a proper case is presented for 
an accounting of particular matters, the account 
may be taken under a general prayer for relief." 
In Corpus Juris Secund urn, Vol. 1, Section 38, sub-
division ( 7), p. 671, it is said: 
"Plaintiff may have relief under a general 
prayer to the extent justified by the facts pleaded." 
Appellants throughout their brief have sought to 
merge the identity of Beckstead Livestock Company, a 
Wyoming corporation, with· the identity of United Bond 
and Finance, a Utah corporation. 
The courts are most reluctant to disregard the doc-
trine of corporate entities and a corporation is ordinarily 
considered as a 'vholly separate entity from its stock-
holders. 
In Commerce Trust Co. v. Woodbury, 77 Fed. 478, at 
p. 487, the court said : 
"Few questions of law are better settled than 
that a corporation is ordinarily a wholly separate 
entity from its stockholders, whether they be one 
or more. (Citing cases) Likewise, we think it must 
be conceded that neither ownership of all of the 
stock of one corporation by another, nor the identity 
of officers in one with officers in another, creates 
a merger of the two corporations into a single entity, 
or makes one either the principal or agent of the 
other." (Citing cases) 
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~-\t pa~e 61 of their brief appellants boldly state that 
the records and exhibits s lHnY respecting the four ranches 
and liYestock standing in the name of Beckstead Livestock 
Company, 
"That the ranches are stocked with 2,000 high 
grade sheep and approximately 350 head of pure 
bred and high grade Hereford cattle, and tha.t the 
entire indebtedness on this large enterprise is less 
than $14,000.00.)) (Italics ours.) 
"re presume appellants 'Yill allo'Y plaintiffs a credit 
for the 1102 head of sheep sold by Beckstead for $5,300.00 
"?hile the trial was in progress, which would reduce the 
number to 998. 
The mortgage indebtedness alone against the Wyom-
ing ranches is in excess of $14,000.00. 
In addition, every foot of land, every hoof of livestock 
and every piece of property standing in the name of Beck-
stead Livestock Company "'"as acquired with money and 
assets 'Yhich belonged solely to United Bond and Finance 
Corporation. 
What is the amount of money and what is the value 
of the property of United Bond that was used for the above 
purposes? 
How much money is owing United Bond for funds ad-
vanced to the liYestock company "~ith 'Yhich to pay its 
operating expenses and losses? 
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'Vhen and how is this money so advanced to be paid 
back to the United Bond? 
The affairs of these two corporations must be thor-
oughly gone into and a full and complete accounting must 
be had. ''r e venture that such accounting will show an 
outstanding unpaid indebtedness of the Beckstead Live-
stock Company considerably nearer the sum of $94,000.00 
than the figure of $14,000.00 stated at p. 61 of appellants' 
brief. 
In Trustees System of Penn. v. Payne, 65 F. (2d) 
103, 107, the court held that a receiver would be granted in 
equity over a solvent subsidiary as ancillary to a receiver-
ship in equity. This is recognized as an extension of the 
doctrine as theretofore applied by courts of equity. The 
court said: 
"It is recognized in principal that the fiction of 
corporate entity may be disregarded when one cor-
poration is so organized and controlled and its af-
fairs: are so conducted that it is, in fact, a mere in-
strumentality or adjunct of another corporation. 
(Citing cases * * * Through long practice courts 
have not hesitated to disregard the doctrine of corpo-
rate entities when the facts justify it. Although \Ye 
know of no instance in which it has been done in 
matters of receivership, we cannot see why the same 
power does not exist in a court or why the law doe8 
not impose upon a court the sante duty in a receiv-
ership matter when) as here) the facts are S'ubsta H-
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tial enongh to justif!l· indeed to con1pel) a finding 
that the fire corporations n-crc so ident~ified with 
the parent corporation as to be a part of it. Being 
of opinion that the law' nzakes no e.x·ception of re-
cei.rershi.ps. lC'e tea-r asu ndcr the lega,l nza.~·e of cor-
porate fiction in lrh ich they hare enveloped them-
selYes and, observing that the six corporations were 
not merely related by stock o"~nership but, like 
wheels in a machine, ".,.ere so closely meshed that all 
functioned together, " ... e find from the bills that in 
legal effect they \Yere one, a finding in consonance 
\Yith the casual statement of the attorney for the 
parent corporation at the hearing that 'the whole 
thing from .AJabama to Pennsylvania is really one 
company.' " (Italics ours.) 
In Commerce Trust Co. v. -n: oodbury, 77 F. ( 2d) 478, 
at p. 487, the court said: 
"": e are constrained by the uncontradicted 
facts to the conclusion that the sales company was, 
as it was controlled, and as it functioned, merely 
an agency or department of the lumber company. 
All of its assets ""'ere furnished, and all of its stock 
O'\Yned by the lumber company, its officers, directors, 
and its main office were the same as those of the 
lumber company, and its employees had, for the 
most part, formerly been employees of the lu1nber 
company. But the strongest undisputed facts con-
straining us to this conclusion are that the presi-
dent of the lumber company had the power to vote 
all of the stock of the sales company, and aside from 
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this po"rer, which was not of itself unusual, had the 
po"rer to remove any officer or director of the sales 
company without cause or notice, and to dominate 
and control performance of its contracts.. * * * 
( Citing cases) 
"In such situation, there are cases which hold 
that a receiver of the parent company, under the 
order of the court, may take over the property of 
the subsidiaries which fall into the banned category 
above described and administer such property, as 
the property of the parent company.,, (Citing cases) 
In Texas Co. v. Roos, (C. C. A. 5) 93 F. ( 2d) 380, at 
pp. 382, 383, the court said : 
"It is immaterial whether the dividends were 
declared and paid specifically for the purpose of 
defrauding appellee and defeating his claim, or for 
the purpose of avoiding taxes, as was stated in argu-
ment. A person is presumed to intend the natural 
and probable consequences of his act. The lower 
court found that any prudent person should have 
known, as both corporations did know, that the pay-
ment of such dividends. would result in insolvency, 
and prevent the appellee from collecting his judg-
ment from the l\1exican Company. It had exactly 
that effect, and both corporations are prresurned to 
have intended to defraud the appellee and defeat 
the payment of his cla.in~. * * * The payment 
of these dividends should be avoided and set aside, 
as to appellee, as a fraud upon his rights. Equity 
has full power to grant relief. Ignoring the corpo-
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rate entity, the court below \Yent to the heart of the 
matter and did justice by granting a decree against 
the Dela\Yare Corporation;,, (Citing cases; italics 
ours.) 
.At p. 73 of their brief appellants comment on Beck-
stead's cross examination, wherein, in substance, he said: 
"if this stock had been allo"\"\Ted and permitted to 
remain in the hands of stockbrokers, no doubt ex-
pensive and serious litigation zcould have been com-
menced long prior to the filing of the co1nplaint 
herein.'' 
vrhy should Beckstead, or the manager of any legiti-
mate company, care "~ ho purchases or holds its stock? 
If the corporation is handling its business properly,-
if it confines its business and investments within the limits 
of its corporate purposes,-if it keeps accurate books and 
if these books honestly reflect its transactions and if proper 
accounting is made of all moneys received and expended, 
why should such a corporation fear that if its stock had 
been permitted to remain in the hands of stockbrokers, 
that "expensive and serious litigation" "rould surely result? 
Do not the remarks of Beckstead above referred to 
indicate that, as manager of the corporation, he knows 
there is something 1Dron.q "Thich will prove "serious" if 
aired out in a court of justice? 
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vVe fear that Beckstead's fears) as above expressed, 
may be exceptionally well founded, and this shows further 
need for an immediate accounting. 
The bonds and obligations of a solvent corporation 
should be redeemed by it at 100 cents on the dollar. If 
Beckstead's corporation is as solvent as he says, what ex-
cuse has he, then, for trading for and buying up the com-
pany's bonds and obligations for only sixty cents on the 
dollar? 
How long will the public deal with and invest money 
in an "investment" company that acquires the reputation 
of paying no dividends, no interest, and only paying back 
$600 of a $1000 investment? 
How· long can such an "investment" company continue 
in the investment business and remain solvent? 
Who "\vould now purchase a nickel's worth of stock in 
the corporation knowing the present stockholders had paid 
a premium of 25lf0 or 35% or 50ro above the par or book 
value of their stock, dependent upon whether they had paid 
Beckstead therefor at $125 or $135 or $150 per unit? 
Who would buy any units of stock if inforn1ed that he 
would never· acquire a vote or voice in the selection of the 
officers or in the management of the affairs of the corpo-
ration? 
,, 
,.'.1 
·i] 
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,,~ho "~ill inYest 1noney in n corpo1·a tion that hasn ,t 
paid dl\idends for oYer ten years·? 
'''"ho \Yould purchase stock in the company knowing 
that there are only 572 shares of voting stock outstanding 
and that 512 of these are o'vned and held by the manager 
and his "~ife "? 
-nrho "~ill inYest money in a company "rhose manager 
has, in \iolation of the Constitution and statutes, ex-
changed and traded his company's stock for stock in other 
corporations opera ted by a brother-in -la "'" 
Appellants are called upon on this appeal to supply 
the correct answers to the above questions. 
That the trial court "'"as deeply conce:fned with these 
matters is shown by the question it asked of the defendant 
Beckstead, and of W'hich appellants, at p. 228 of their brief, 
complain that, 
"The only implication one can draw from this 
question is that the Court believed in his own mind 
that there "'"ere reasons other than the inability of 
the purchaser to keep up his payments, and that 
these reasons reflected upon the honor, honesty and 
integrity of the defendants to this action." (Italics 
ours.) 
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CONCLUSION 
The stockholders have put their money into the cor- :·1i 
poration for which units. of stock were issued to them. 
This money has all been paid to Beckstead and his as-
socia tes for the corporate business. 
For every unit of stock purchased by them these stock-
holders have paid Beckstead a premium for commissions 
of either 25 lf0 , 35 lfo or 50 lfo over and above the one hun-
dred dollar par value of the Preferred stock. 
Beckstead and his salesmen came first and paid thenl-
selves in full out of the very first money paid by the sub-
scribers of the stock. Thus did Beckstead and his sales-
men, during the entire stock-selling campaign, reap their 
harvest by receiving not less than $25 and at times as 
much as $50 on each unit of s:tock sold. 
The balance of the stockholders' money, remaining 
after payment to Beckstead of his commission, was received 
by Beckstead to be used for and to constitute the capital 
of the corporation for investment purposes. 
As to this money of the stockholders in the amount of 
$100 per unit, the board of directors of the corporation are 
"but trustees of an estate for all of the stockholders". 
(Cantwell et al. v. Columbia Lead Co., 97 S. W. 167 
at p. 179.) 
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The plaintiff stockholders are entitled to kno\v what 
their trustees haYe done \Yith the money so delivered to 
such trustees and comprising the trust estate. 
The only class of stock \Yhich has interested Beck-
stead is the Common Class .. .-\ .. rot-ing stock. Without pay-
ing any money into the trust estate \vhatever therefor, 
he has had issued to himself a total of 512 shares of this 
class of stock, and in 1933 he caused 511 of these shares to 
be transferred from his o'vn name to the name of his wife, 
~Irs. Stella C. Beckstead. 
These 512 shares of Common Class A voting stock so 
issued to Beckstead and his wife, without consideration) 
does not rightfully belong to them. At all times it has 
been and still is tlle property of the corporation and such 
of its shareholders as have paid real money for the respec-
tive interests "~hich they have acquired in the corporation. 
'Vhat will an accounting show that Beckstead has 
done with the moneys and assets of the trust estate? 
This query may not be answered until a complete ac-
cottnting is bad. At present plaintiffs' only information 
comes from the fragmentary and disconnected testimony 
elicited at the trial of this case, as is revealed by the record 
herein. 
Certain assets of the corporation, being certificates 
of stock therein, Beckstead exchanged and traded for 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-134-
11,800 shares of stock in American Keene Cement & Plaster 
Company. A certificate for 6800 shares of such stock was 
issued direct to United Bond and :E"'inance Corporation, 
and a certificate for the remainder was on the same day 
issued to Beckstead, individually. This whole transaction 
is illegal. It is expressly prohibited by Section 5, Article 
XII, of the Constitution and 103-12-4, subd. 5, R. S. Utah. 
Assets of the corporation in the amount of $85,158.5± 
have been used by Beckstead in buying up the corporation's 
own stock. This, likewise, is an illegal transaction. It is 
prohibited by both Constitution and statutes, as was de-
cided by this court in Pace v. Pace Bros.) 91 Utah 132. 
All this stock of the corporation was bought by it at 
large and unconscionable discounts, being another illegal 
transaction expressly prohibited by 103-12-4, subd. 3, R. S. 
Utah. 
While the total of the book or par value of the corpo-
ration's own stock so bought by Beckstead with the assets 
of the trust estate is $203,087.11, yet this value is achieved 
by figuring the Preferred stock at only $100 per share. 
None of the stockholders \Vho put real money in the stock 
received any of it at book or par value. They were required 
to pay the commissions of Beckstead and his salesmen of 
from $25 to $50 per unit in addition to the par value. Thus 
the real and actual investment in money of the stockhold-
ers in their stock so re-purchased by the corporation is 
greatly in excess of the sum of $203,087.11. 
ji 
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llad the8e transal'tions been legitimatP ones, had it 
been Beckstead's intention to permit the re1naining stock-
holders to share in the .. profits .. of these unlawful activ-
ities, 'Yhy did Beckstead not cancel the stock certificates 
so purchased and issue ne"? ones to his corporation in lieu 
thereof? 
''""hy did the manager, Beckstead, permit this vast 
amount of stock to ""accumulate" uncancelled) but endorsed 
in bla 11 k) in "a little pouch'' \Yithout transfer or reissue, 
until this most serious litigation \Yas precipitated? 
\\'"hy should the books and records, including the stock 
record of this corporation, not reflect the true condition 
and the actual transactions of the corporation at all times? 
-nrhy should Beckstead wait eight years before trans-
ferring or reissuing the certificates of stock which he ac-
quired in 1931 from the witnesses, Mrs. Mayme 'Vilson, 
Henry Hoffman, Pearl Jackson and other stockholders, 
too numerous to mention. 
'v'"ith assets of the trust estate, Beckstead acquired 
and purchased the automobiles "'hich he drove; the four 
separate homes in \Yhich he and his family lived in ex-
clusive residential sections of Salt Lake City; an insurance 
agency; the controlling stock in Ashton-Jenkins Company; 
the Densley-Beckstead sheep; the Wyoming ranches and 
livestock and a large amount of other property \Vhich we 
cannot here mention. 
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\Vhy should Beckstead take and use the moneys of 
the trust estate to purchase, in partnership with Densley, 
a band of sheep and thereupon earmark these sheep with 
his own tags? 
vVhat right had Beckstead to agree that the profits 
:rJI 
to result from this sheep venture should accrue, not to the .:~ 
corporation, nor to the trust estate, but that they should :~ 
be profit to him, individually? ·r~ 
vVhat right had Beckstead to use the funds and assets 
of the estate to acquire land and other property and take 
title thereto in his own name, individually? 
Each and every one of these transactions, in both fact 
and law, constituted a conversion of the trust ~state by 
Beckstead. 
When a person brands the cattle and horses of another 
·with a brand recorded in his name, individually, and when, 
\vith aluminum tags bearing his name, he tags the sheep 
of another, ordinarily such person may not be said to be 
engaging in either an idle act nor an innocent pastime. 
By such acts he places upon such personal property 
his badge of ownership. Thereby he not only di-stinctly 
claims ownership, but he actually establishes a prirna facie 
ti tie in himself which all persons thereafter dealing with 
the property so branded and ear marked must recognize. 
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Such distinct acb~ of tloininion so "·r<ntgfnlly exerte<l 
oYer another person~~ property, being in denial of and in-
consistent "?ith the latter's right therein, constitute con-
version. Conversion by a fiduciary constitutes larceny. 
From the year 1931 Beckstead has never missed a 
pay day. He receives from the corporation a most sub-
stantial salary to manage its affairs. His salary on the 
very day these lines are "rritten is $100.00 per week. 
For this he should 'York for the interests of the cor-
poration and its stockholders. He should be engaged in 
more "?orthy endeavors than trading the stockholders out 
of their stock and treating the assets of the corporation 
and of the trust estate as though same and all thereof 
were his indi cidual property. 
The stockholders have been most kind to Beckste~d, 
but with W'"hat coin has he repaid them? 
Just so long as the corporation continues to be dom-
inated and controlled by Beckstead will its affairs continue 
to be grossly mismanaged. No stockholder has any hope 
now of ever receiving back or realizing any appreciable 
amount of the money which he originally put into the com-
pany. ''Tith Beckstead in the saddle they 'vill never receive 
any dividends on their stock or earnings on their inyest-
ments. 
No court should and no court will tolerate such ruth-
less and unfair treatment of stockholders. 
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Beckstead's own testimony standing alone convicts 
him of gros.s mismanagement and of evil, systematic, 
habitual and unlawful practices. 
If there were no other testimony in this entire record 
than his admissions and state1nents, there would be ample 
proof for a court to displace him with its own officer, a 
receiver, to order a complete accounting, to restrain de-
fendants and to award the stockholders the other relief 
for which they pray. 
The affairs of this corporation cannot,-they must 
not remain in the hands of Wesley R. Beckstead. He has 
already remained too long in the saddle. His day is done. 
He must be unseated. 
The great wonder is that the corporation has survived 
such gross mismanagement as long as it has. 
This fleecing of poor investors of their hard-earned 
savings must be stopped. 
Great and lasting injustice has already been done 
these people. 
Courts of justice most certainly are not impotent to 
grant relief· upon the showing of such systematic and 
habitual evil practices. 
See: 
(Decision herein on merits by Judge Schiller 
of Jan. 2, 1941, and decision denying motion for a 
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ne"? trial herein by Judge EYans of ~larch 19, 1941 . 
... -\ppendix to this brief.) 
... \s "yas said in Cant,vell, et al. Y. Columbia Lead Co., 
97 S. "'"· 167 at p. 179: 
"But when all this has been said, it may fur-
ther be said that this court has never denied power 
in a chancellor to prevent a scheme of irreparable 
injury and "yrong merely because the movers in that 
scheme speak and act in a corporate capacity rather 
than in an indindual capacity." 
The court's decree and its order appointing a receiver 
are fully warranted by both the pleadings and proof herein. 
The appeal being 'Yithout merit, the judgment should 
be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
IRVINE) SKEEN & THURMAN 
L. DELOS DAINES 
of Salt Lake City) Utah 
LESTER H. LOBLE 
HUGH R. ADAIR 
of Helena) Montana 
Attorneys for Respondents 
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APPENDIX 
Decision on Merits by Judge Schiller 
January 2) 1941 
I~ THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT, STATE OF UTAH, 
I:N .A.ND FOR SALT LAKE COlJNTY 
R. D. TOBIN, etc., 
Plaintiff) 
vs. 
UNITED BOND AND FINANCE CORPORATION, a 
corporation, et al., 
DECISION OF THE COURT 
Case No. 65072 
Defendants. 
In this case, the plaintiffs who are non-resident stock-
holders of the defendant, United Bond and Finance Cor-
poration, seek a decree of this Court ordering, among other 
things, that the defendants. account to the United Bond 
and Finance Corporation for all money and property 
"illegally and wrongfully diverted from the defendant, 
United Bond and Finance Co1nporation" and that a receiv-
er be appointed for the corporation. All of the defendants, 
except Egbert Pandolfo, appeared anu answered. 
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Prior to the trial on the merits, a protracted hearing 
was had on the plaintiffs' order to show cause why a re-
ceiver pendente lite should not be appointed. The hearing 
consumed more than three trial weeks and resulted in a 
voluminous record. A motion V\ras then made by the plain-
tiffs for a preferential setting of the case and the Court 
gran ted the motion. At the time of the trial on the Ineri ts, 
counsel for the respective parties stipulated that the evi-
dence offered at the hearing on the order to show cause, 
subject to the same objections as made at the time of the 
latter hearing, might be considered by the Court as the 
evidence at the trial on the merits. It was further stipu-
lated that additional evidence might be offered in the 
discretion of counsel, and that any witness who testified 
at the prior hearing might be further interrogated and 
subjected to further cross-examination at the trial. Little 
additional evidence, however, ·was offered at the trial. 
Because of the nature of the issues, the Court granted 
to both sides wide latitude ""ith respect to the proof. The 
plaintiffs do not contend that the United Bond and I~"'i­
nance Corporation (hereafter simply called "the corpora-
tion") is insolvent. They do contend, however, that dating 
back to 19-31, there has been a continuous course of mis-
conduct on the part of the corporation's directors and par-
ticularly on the part of the defendant, W. R. Beckstead, 
which has \Yorked to the detriment of the corporation and 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-143-
of the stockholders; that approxin1ately one-third of the 
corporation's propert~~ ha8 been transferred to the defend-
ant, Beckstead Livestock Company, a Wyoming corpora-
tion, organized by Beckstead; that while the stock of the· 
Wyoming corporation is ,yholly o"rned by the United Bond 
and ~-,inance Corporation, yet the funds of the two com-
panies have been intermingled and it is impossible to 
ascertain from the records of either company the financial 
status of the '''"yoming company; that approximately 90 
per cent. of all the outstanding voting stock of the corpo-
ration is under the control of the defendant, Beckstead, 
",.ho utilizes his power to control a "dummy" board of 
directors and the affairs of the corporation to the detri-
ment of the corporation and of the stockholders. 
The evidence establishes that the corporation (first 
known as the United States Bond and Finance Corpora-
tion) ·was organized by Beckstead and two associates on 
or about September 27, 1927, with an authorized capital 
stock of 500 shares of common stock with no par value and 
500 shares of preferred stock of a par value $100.00 per 
share, the latter stock to receive dividends at the rate of 
$7.00 per annum. One hundred shares of each kind of 
stock was subscribed, according to the articles of incor-
poration, by the incorporators and $1000.00 'Yas paid in. 
Beckstead testified that he personally drew the articles 
of incorporation. 
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A series of an1endments to the articles increased the 
amount of capital stock and divided it into various classes. 
After the last of these amendments affecting the capital 
stock, the structure was as follows : 
1000 shares Common Class A stock, no par value. 
10000 shares Common Class AA stock, no par value. 
7500 shares Preferred stock, par value $100.00 per 
share. 
5000 shares Common Class B stock, no par value. 
The holders of Common Class A stock have the ex-
clusive voting rights in the corporation and, therefore, the 
exclusive right to select the directors, officers and agents 
of the corporation and to control the affairs and establish 
the policy of the corporation. By the year 1933, 90 per 
cent. of this stock exclusive of that held by the corpora-
tion, stood in the name of Stella C. Beckstead, wife of the 
defendant, W. R. Beckstead. One share each was held by 
Beckstead, Spillsbury and Evans 'Yho now constitute the 
board of directors.. There is no satisfactory evidence in 
the record establishing what value, if any, Beckstead or 
his wife gave for this stock. 
It follows that at least since the year 1933, and very 
likely much earlier than that, Beckstead and his wife have 
had exclusive control of the corporation. Spillsbury, who 
testified at the first hearing, knows little, if anything, of 
the affairs of the corporation and has acquiesced in all 
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deals of the corporation \Y hich hay ha Ye been called to his 
attention. It is also fair to conclude from the evidence, 
that Evans, "Tho is the bookkeeper for the company and 
"~ho paid nothing for his share of Class A Common Stock, 
is likew"ise a "dummy'' director \Yho does the bidding of 
Beckstead. 
The original articles of incorporation provided for a 
board of seYen directors. It is significant that after 
trouble had arisen with the Montana stockholders, the 
"holders~' of Class ... :\.. Common stock, on February 2, 1940, 
amended the articles reducing the number of directors to 
three, and further amending Article X which read: "Three 
members of the Board of Directors shall constitute a quor-
um with authority to transact the affairs of the corpora-
tion" by striking that article and substituting a new article 
which provides that two members of the board shall con-
stitute a quorum. Thus Beckstead with the concurrence 
of his bookkeeper, may now transact the business and con-
trol the affairs of the corporation which in truth is what 
the evidence discloses to be the fact. 
During the first years of the corporation's existence, 
an active campaign to sell "units" of the corporation stock 
was carried on by Beckstead and his associates. nTontana 
residents invested large sums in the corporate stock. But 
early in the campaign Class A Comon stock was withheld 
from investors and non-voting Class AA Common stock 
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was sold to them. By this method .the investors who put 
real money into the corporation were wholly disenfran-
chised. During those years, the corporation filed a num-
ber of statements with the Clerk of Salt Lake County (as 
required by Utah law) in which it stated the nature of the 
corporation's business variously as follows: "Bond and 
Finance Corporation"; "Selling bonds of the corporation 
secured by first mortgages on real property and in dealing 
in com1nercial paper, contracts, etc."; "The selling of First 
Mortgage Bonds and Capital Stoc~ of the corporation and 
making of First Mortgage loans"; "~1ortgage Loan and 
Finance". 
In 1931, a course of conduct at variance with the an-
nounced business of the corporation was initiated by Beck-
stead and his then collaborator, James C. Hill. A "phan-
tom" corporation known as Investors Thrift Company was 
organized with Beckstead and Hill as principal directors. 
The evidence discloses that Beckstead and Hill then had 
transferred to themselves as individuals certain real estate 
contracts of purchase owned by United Bond and Finance 
Company, which they, in turn, assigned to Investors Thrift 
Company in exchange for stock in the last named corpo-
ration. No consideration ever passed, so far as the evi-
dence discloses, from Backstead and Hill to the United 
Bond and Finance Company at the time they accepted the 
real estate contracts. That the purpose of organizing the 
Investors Thrift Company, was to trade stockholders of the 
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United Bond and Finance eorporation out of their stock 
and that such purpose "·as aecon1plished in a number of 
instances is amply borne out by the evidence in the case. 
:Xot content "·ith this, Beckstead devised the scheme to 
trade those "·ho had become stockholders of Investors 
Thrift company out of their stock by a further exchange of 
questionable securities and whiskey warehouse receipts. 
'Yhen the grossly dishonest purposes of the Investors 
Thrift Company had been accomplished, this company was 
dissolved, the real estate contracts were reassigned to the 
defendant corporation, and the books of the "phantom" 
corporation "disappeared" although a small portion of 
them, some slightly burned on the edges, appear to have 
fallen into the hands of the plaintiffs and were used at 
the trial. 
In managing the affairs of the defendant corporation 
Beckstead caused the stockholders to become discouraged 
and then armed salesmen and security pickers with "sucker 
lists" of his stockholders and investors in Utah, Nevada 
and ~Iontana. It is a reasonable inference from the evi-
dence that Beckstead knew and condoned the trading of 
worthless or questionable securities for the stock of the 
corporation's stockholders. And it is established that 
contrary to Utah law, (Pace v. Pace Brothers Oo1npany_, 
91 Utah, 132) he utilized funds of the company to purchase 
stock so obtained, from these sales.men. As a result of 
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these dealings a series of lawsuits have been filed and are 
pending at the present time. 
It is true that these illegal purchases of the stock 
have tapered off recently, particularly since the year 1936, 
although in the years 1937, 1938 and 1939, such purchases 
were still being consummated. 
During the earlier years of the corporation's existence, 
stock and bonds of the corporation 'vere sold under install-
ment contracts. Some of the subscribers defaulted and 
the amounts which they had paid in were forfeited. The 
audits produced in court do not disclose what happened to 
the forfeited payments and no books were produced from 
which the disposition of these funds could be ascertained. 
During the life of the Investors Thrift Company, an 
insurance agency was purchased by Beckstead 'Yith cor-
poration funds, but the evidence does not disclose whether 
a profit was gained or a loss sustained by this venture. 
The same situation prevails with respect to the purchase 
of the controlling stock of Edward E. Jenkins in the Ash-
ton-Jenkins Company at a time when the latter company 
was in financial difficulties. 
In the last several years, Beckstead has caused ap-
proximately one-third of the corporation's assets to be 
invested in cattle ranches and cattle in the State of Wyon1-
ing. In the first instance the deeds to the Wyoming land 
'vere taken in the name of Beckstead and his wife although 
'1( 
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funds of the defendant eorpo1·a tion \Yere used to purchase 
the land. Later the Beckstead I.~iYestock Company was 
incorporated in ·yvyoming. Beckstead and two of his 
associates "·ere chosen directors and all of the treasury 
stock of the -nTyoming company "·as is.sued to them. The 
stock certificates and the stubs for this original issue are 
missing from the improYised stock book of the 'Vyoming 
company. Later, ho,Yever, the entire capital stock was 
transferred to the United Bond and :F'inance Corporation, 
leaving the directors with no qualifying shares. Thus, at 
the time ".hen the hearing on the order to show cause in 
this case was held, the -nryoming corporation was func-
tioning "·ith a board of directors who could not qualify. 
Between this hearing and the trial on the meritg three 
qualifying shares were transferred without consideration 
to Beckstead and associates so that they might legally 
qualify as directors of the 'Vyoming corporation. 
That Beckstead was and is handling the Wyoming 
corporation as though it were his private property is estab-
lished by the evidence. He is interested in ranching and 
stockraising. No separate books were kept of the livestock 
company until recently. In 1939, according to the last 
audit of the United Bond and Finance Comporation, it 
held a note in the sum of $28,000.00 ""hich had been exe-
cuted by the livestock company and Beckstead and his 
bookkeeper are uncertain as to whether or not this repre-
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sented the total indebtedness of the livestock company. 
]""~urthermore the funds of the two corporations have been 
commingled, the income from the lTtah corporation being 
used to pay expenses at the ranches and at other times the 
wool and lamb crops being used to discharge taxes and 
other obligations of the Utah corporation. Because of 
this jumbling of accounts, it is impossible to determine 
whether or not either the Utah or the Wyoming corpora-
tion is being operated at a profit or a loss. 
The most serious result of the taking of large sums 
of United Bond and Finance Company assets and invest-
ing them in Wyoming cattle ranches-a far cry from the 
announced original purposes of the corporation-has. been 
that it has. resulted in a corporation which possesses a 
"split personality." The money invested in Wyoming has 
been removed still further from the disenfranchised stock-
holders of the Utah corporation and these non-voting stock-
holders may be powerless to prevent Beckstead not only 
from diverting one-third of the assets of the United Bond 
and Finance Corporation into the ranching corporation, 
but also fron1 diverting one-half or all of the assets if he 
should so choose. If this were done, the Utah corporation 
would become merely the record owner of the stock in the 
Wyoming corporation and Beckstead might 'vithout inter-
ference experiment with his ranching hobby in Wyoming. 
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{Tnder these circumstances can a court of equity right-
full~· intervene and appoint n receiver or must it acknowl-
edge that it is powerless to protect the minority stock-
holders? 
Counsel for the defendants have presented to the Court 
two excellent briefs on the facts and on the law of this case 
"yhich have been carefully studied by the Court. The de-
fendants contend that the complaint does not state a cause 
of action ; that the primary relief sought is the appoint-
ment of a receiver which is not allowable under Utah law, 
since the appointment of a receiver is ancillary to an action 
w·hich is pending for other purposes; that the evidence 
does not sustain the issues raised by the pleadings and is 
too remote; and that the plaintiffs have been guilty of 
laches. 
These briefs are striking examples of the difference in 
approach of the advocate and the judge to a legal problem. 
The one engages in the contest to win; the other endeavors 
to decide justly and in accordance with the law. It is oft-
tin1es impossible, therefore, for the advocate to see any 
point of vie\v other than that of his client. To an extent, 
this is desirable for it makes. for a vigorous advocacy of 
the client's case and this Court not only admires but be-
lieves in the aggressive and vigorous presentation of a 
ease. But the Court must see both sides of the controversy 
and must weigh all the conflicting factors. 
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With the statements of the law in the defendants' 
brief the Court is in general agreement. It is in the appli-
cation of these principles to the facts in this case, that the 
Court cannot agree with defendants' counsel. 
Although the Utah Supreme Court has not spoken on 
the matter, this Court will agree with defendants' counsel 
that under statutes such as ours (Section 104-20-1), the 
appointment of a receiver is probably permissible only in 
a pending action in which some other relief is asked in 
addition to the appointment of a receiver. In other words, 
under our code the appointment of a receiver is ancillary 
remedy in aid of the primary object of the litigation. 
Furthermore such relief must be germane to the principal 
suit. 
A careful analysis of the plaintiffs' complaint leads 
to the conclusion that it sufficiently states a cause of action 
for an accounting the proof in this case, although broad, 
is gern1ane to that issue. Defendants' counsel refuse to 
draw any reasonable and permissible inferences from the 
testimony given that would in any way sustain this issue. 
But the Court, if it is the trier of facts, is entitled to draw 
from the evidence reasonable and justifiable inferences. 
The Court believes: that not only does the complaint state 
a cause of action for an accounting, but that the plaintiffs 
have sustained their burden by a preponderance of the 
evidence. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-153-
This being the primary issue, is there any legal neces-
sity for the appointn1ent of a receiver? It is the law that 
a receiver may be appointed at the instance of minority 
stockholders in cases of gross mismanagement or evil con-
duct on the part of the directors even though the corpora-
tion is not insolvent. The appointment of a receiver, how-
ever, is often a question of extreme nicety and requires the 
exercise of sound judgment. The Court must weigh the 
violated rights and the hazardous position of the minority 
stockholders against the right of a solvent corporation to 
continued existence under its present management. It 
must decide "\Yhether or not the appointment of a receiver 
will protect those rights or merely cause the "civil" death 
of the corporation with consequent loss to all stockholders. 
Past mismanagement and evil acts on the part of the 
director "\vho is managing the business as a private enter-
prise will not, in and of itself, be sufficient for the appoint-
ment of a receiver. Says Fletcher in Vol. 16 of his work 
on ((Corporations-'-' at page 172: 
"-before a court of equity will appoint a receiver 
of a corporation which is a going and prosperous 
concern, and is neither insolvent nor in danger of 
insolvency, because it does things which are dis-
honest, the evil practices must be systematic and 
habitual and so interwoven as to become part of the 
general business.-'-' (Underscoring ours.) 
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The evil practices have not ceased in the instant case 
and are intimately interwoven in the course now being 
pursued through the abstracting of assets from the corpo-
ration in which these plaintiffs invested their money and 
placing these assets in a corporation of doubtful sound-
ness and which is wholly beyond the control of anyone 
except Beckstead. Such conduct if persisted in, can well 
scuttle the Utah corporation. 
The claim that the plaintiffs have been guilty of laches 
in not demanding an accounting earlier does not take into 
consideration the realities of the situation. These plain-
tiffs all live in another state from which the corporation 
withdrew after securing their money. They have not bad 
the opportunity to keep in close contact with the operation 
of the corporation nor to obtain exact knowledge of the 
business methods employed. Their first opportunity has 
come during the trial of this action. It cannot therefore, 
be said that they are guilty of laches. 
The order of this Court is that the individual defend-
ants account to this Court within 30 days from the signing 
of the decree for all transactions had respecting the for-
feiture of installment sale contracts on stocks and bonds; 
for the transactions involving the purchase of the insur-
ance company and the purchase of the controlling stock 
of Edward E. Jenkins in the Ashton Jenkins Company; 
for all transactions had and money advanced to Beckstead 
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Livestock Company; that a break-down of the valuation 
of the present yarious real estate holdings of the corpora-
tion be furnished together 'Yi th an accounting of the oper-
ation costs and rents of these holdings. 
The court grants the petition for the appointment of a 
recei"ler "ith the customary powers of a receiver in such 
cases, to take and keep possission of the corporation's prop-
erty, to receiYe rents, to collect debts, to compound and 
compromise the same, to make transfers and generally to 
do such acts respecting the property as the Court may 
authorize. 
The Court appoints Tracy Loan & Trust Company of 
Salt Lake City, Utah, to be the receiver of the corporation. 
The officers of this company have been contacted by the 
Court and they have indicated that their company is will-
ing to accept the trust. The Court finds that Tracy Loan 
& Trust Company is a fit and proper party so to act, since 
it in no "'"ay is connected with any of the parties litigant 
and is in a position to act impartially as between the 
parties and is so organized and staffed that it can perform 
its duties expeditiously and efficiently. 
It is the Court's belief, from reading of the cases, that 
the plaintiffs have prematurely asked for the allowance 
of attorneys' fees. This issue is reserved without prejudice 
to the plaintiffs' right seasonably to renew the request in 
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the court having supervision of the receivership and the 
enforcement of the Court's decree. 
Counsel for the plaintiffs are requested to prepare, 
Sierve and present, findings of fact, conclusions of law, 
order and decree in conformity to this decision. 
Dated, January 2, 1941. 
HERBERT M. SCHILLER, 
Judge. 
Decision Denying Motion for New Trial by Judge E.vans 
(March 19, 1941) 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT, IN AND FOR SALT 
I.JAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH. 
R. D. TOBIN, et al, 
Plaintiffs, 
V8. 
UNITED BOND AND FINANCE CO., a corporation, 
et al, 
Defendants . 
. DECISION ON MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL 
It has fallen to my lot to review the decision of Judge 
Schiller. It is perhaps unfortunate that the Judge could 
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not revie\Y his O\Yn decision, and yet the defendants had 
a right to move for a ne\Y trial, even though it involved the 
reading of a voluminous record, as \Yell as the study of 
extended briefs. 
The first question that presents itself is this: What 
could be accomplished by granting a motion for a new 
trial? To say the least it would be tremendously expensive 
and result in making a record probably not substantially 
different from the one contained in the 17 42 page record 
already made. Eventually, I surmise, the case will find 
its way to the Supreme Court for review, and there any 
doubtful questions may be finally resolved. 
But aside from these considerations there seems to 
me to be no escape from the findings of Judge Schiller. 
Under the present management of the United Bond and 
Finance Company it seems entirely improbable that the 
stock held by the minority stockholders could ever be of 
any value. The stockholders have not been taken care 
of in the way they had a right to expect. When it is con-
sidered that the only funds that have been invested are 
such funds as have been derived from the proceeds of the 
purchase of stock, and when it is considered that all of 
these purchases were made at the solicitation of the organi-
zers of the company, it then became the duty of the de-
fendants to safeguard that investment. This they did not 
do. And that brings us to the question as to whether or 
not they can obtain redress at law. I am impressed with 
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the statement of the principle cited in the Defendants' 
reply brief, McDougal vs. Huntington & Broad Top R. R. 
& Co., 147 Atlantic 574. There may be theoretically a 
remedy at law. I cannot, however, convince myself that 
it is adequate. 
It is insisted that the receivership is the sole relief 
asked. I regard it as ancillary to the accounting, but that 
is a questoin which I would prefer to have settled by the 
Supreme Court. There is no doubt that these minority 
stockholders are entitled to full redress. Just what that 
may be I am not at this time prepared to say. The receiver 
should be called upon to make recommendations and as 
soon as the object has been accomplished, the receiver 
should be discharged. This. receivership does not contem-
plate a dissolution, but only necessary readjustments. 
We cannot rely upon the individual defendants to bring 
this about. Being in absolute control they can still pro-
ceed to do what they have been doing over a period of years, 
destroy the value of the stock in hands other than their 
own and at the same time enhance the value of the stock 
held by them. I am assuming that the stock held in the 
name of Mrs. Beckstead is in fact owned by the defendant, 
W. R. Beckstead. 
The motion for a new trial is denied. 
March 19, 1941. 
P. 0. EVANS 
Judge. 
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